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John Mukum Mbaku* 
ABSTRACT 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been 
significant progress in the recognition and protection of human rights around the world. The 
international community has, since 1948, adopted several treaties, which impose obligations on 
States Parties to make certain that the human and fundamental rights of their citizens are 
recognized and fully protected. Although human rights are considered the domain of international 
law, international legal scholars have argued that national governments—that is, the governments 
of States Parties—must function as the mechanisms for enforcing international human rights law. 
However, in order for national governments to enforce international human rights law, each 
country that ratifies an international human rights treaty must incorporate the treaty into its 
national constitution and hence, create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. Thus, an 
African country can, through its constitution, cast away any doubts regarding whether 
international law, including customary international law, is law within its jurisdiction. This 
article notes that in African countries whose constitutions do not expressly define a law of reception 
for international law, it is still possible for domestic courts to employ international law and 
comparative case law in the interpretation and adjudication of cases involving human rights. After 
examining cases from several African countries to determine the extent to which domestic courts 
have utilized international law and comparative law sources in their decisions generally and 
interpretation of national constitutions in particular, the article then examines two cases from the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa involving socio-economic rights. It is determined that, even 
where African States have not yet domesticated international human rights instruments and 
created rights that are justiciable in domestic courts, progressive judiciaries can still enhance the 
recognition and protection of human rights by using international law as an interpretive tool in 
their legal adjudications. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal must remain the domestication of 
international human rights instruments to create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars, policymakers, as well as, human rights activists, 
consider the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and the 
subsequent adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) on December 10, 1948, by the UN General Assembly1 as 
“the beginning of the modern struggle to [recognize and] protect 
human rights.”2 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the origins of 
human rights can be traced back “to early philosophical and religious 
ideas as well as legal theories of the ‘natural law’—a law higher than 
the ‘positive law’ of states (such as legislation).’”3 These theories posit 
that “positive laws must either be derived from or reflect ‘natural law’ 
because individuals have certain immutable rights as human beings.”4 
Since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the global 
community “has codified a series of fundamental precepts that are 
intended to prevent such grave abuses as arbitrary killing, torture, 
discrimination, starvation, and forced eviction.”5 In addition, 
“[s]tandards have also been developed for positive rights such that 
governments can provide the means of assuring, for example, fair 
trials, education, and health care.”6 During this period, international 
                                               
*John Mukum Mbaku is an Attorney and Counselor at Law (licensed in the State of 
Utah) and Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of Economics & John S. 
Hinckley Research Fellow at Weber State University (Ogden, Utah, USA). He is also 
a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. He 
received the J.D. degree and Graduate Certificate in Environmental and Natural 
Resources Law from the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, where he 
was Managing Editor of the Utah Environmental Law Review, and the Ph.D. 
(economics) from the University of Georgia. This article reflects only the present 
considerations and views of the author, which should not be attributed to either 
Weber State University or the Brookings Institution. 
1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by UN General Assembly 
Resolution 217 (III), on December 10, 1948, at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. See 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res. 217 (IIII), December 10, 1948, 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (October 3, 2019). 
 2 DAVID WEISSBRODT AND CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2007). 
 3 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 4 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 5 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 6 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
582 
and regional organizations, as well as governments, have developed 
and adopted various “procedures for protecting against and providing 
remedies for human rights abuses.”7 
Human rights are generally considered the domain of 
international law.8 Given that treaties and custom are the most 
important sources of international law, any study of international 
human rights law must necessarily involve taking a look at treaties.9 
One of the most important treaties of the modern era is the United 
Nations Charter, which is a “multilateral treaty among all the UN 
member nations” and which “established the United Nations.”10 With 
respect to international human rights, the most important treaties are 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)11 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”),12 both of which were drafted by the United 
Nations. The two covenants, together with the UDHR, are generally 
referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights.13 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which was adopted on December 16, 1966, and opened for signature 
on December 19, 1966, at New York, entered into force on March 23, 
1976, in accordance with the treaty’s article 49.14 As of this writing, the 
                                               
 7 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 8 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 9 Treaties are defined as “agreements between nations that are intended to 
have binding legal effect between the governments that have formally agreed to 
them.” WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 10 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(December 16, 1966). 
 12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (December 16, 1966). 
 13 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. See also CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS, 
THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2–
3 (2015) (noting, inter alia, that the ICESCR, the UDHR and the ICCPR are 
collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights). 
 14 Article 49(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states that “[t]he present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date 
of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.” See ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 
49(1). 
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ICCPR has been ratified by 173 States.15 The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was also adopted on 
December 16, 1966, and opened for signature on December 19, 1966, 
entered into force on January 3, 1976, in accordance with article 27 of 
the treaty.16 As of this writing, the ICESCR has been ratified by 170 
States.17 
Given the fact that the global community does not have a 
“world government” that can make certain that human rights are 
recognized and protected, the question is: Who enforces international 
human rights law? While noting that human rights law is part of 
international law, legal scholars have argued that “[t]he most effective 
mechanism for enforcing international law [including international 
human rights law] is for each ratifying government to incorporate its 
treaties and customary obligations into national laws.”18 Some African 
countries have already modified their national constitutions to 
expressly define how international law should be treated by their 
domestic courts. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kenya, 2010, states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya 
shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.”19 In 
addition, the Kenyan Constitution also states that “[t]he general rules 
of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.”20 The 
Constitution of the Republic of Bénin states that “[t]reaties or 
agreements lawfully ratified shall have, upon publication, an authority 
                                               
 15 See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Status of Treaties, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 3, 2019). 
 16 Article 27(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights states that “[t]he present Covenant shall enter into force three 
months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.” See 
ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 27(1). 
 17 See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Status of Treaties, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 3, 2019). 
 18 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 19 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(6). 
 20 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(5). 
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superior to that of laws, without prejudice for each agreement or treaty 
in its application by the other party.”21 
Whether an international treaty that has been signed and 
ratified by a country can automatically become a part of that country’s 
national laws will depend on “how effect is given to international 
instruments in the particular country.”22 Within the international law 
literature, there exist two well-established approaches to the 
determination of how effect is given to international law instruments 
or how domestic courts receive international and foreign law. These 
are the “monist” approach,23 and the “dualist” approach.24 In those 
countries in which the relationship between international law and 
domestic law is regulated by monism, “the latter and the former 
comprise one single legal order within the nation’s legal system.”25 
In countries that follow the monist approach, however, within 
the domestic legal system, international law is superior to domestic law. 
Hence, “in an African country which adheres to this approach, the 
provisions of international human rights instruments, for example, 
override any contrary domestic law.”26 This assumes, of course, that 
                                               
 21 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN, 1990, art. 147. Note that 
“Benin” (Republic of Benin) is the English spelling of the country’s name and 
“Bénin” (République du Bénin) is the French spelling. Since the country prefers the 
French spelling, this article will use “Bénin” or Republic of Bénin throughout. 
 22 Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and 
Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 447 (2012). 
 23 The monist approach to international law is prevalent in countries that 
follow “the civil law tradition derived from Roman law and include such nations as: 
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Germany,” as well as Francophone and 
Lusophone countries in Africa. See WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. See also Fombad, 
supra note 22, at 447. See also Graham Hudson, Neither Here nor There: The (Non-) Impact 
of International Law on Judicial Reasoning in Canada and South Africa, 21 CANADIAN J. L. 
& JURISPRUDENCE 321 (2008) (examining, inter alia, the monist and dualist 
approaches to judicial reception of international and foreign law). 
 24 The dualist approach is prevalent in the countries that follow the 
Common Law tradition of England and Wales and which spread later to former 
British colonies (e.g., Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and several 
Anglophone African countries). See, e.g., Fombad, supra note 22, at 447. 
 25 John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and Limits on the Sovereignty of African 
States, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 43, 69 (2018). 
 26 Mbaku, supra note 25, at 69. 
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the African country with the monist system has signed and ratified the 
international human rights instrument in question. 
Specifically, in those countries that follow the monist approach 
to international law, once an international treaty has been signed and 
ratified by the country, it is not necessary for national authorities to 
domesticate the treaty and create rights that are justiciable in national 
courts. For, the act of ratification alone automatically incorporates that 
international instrument into national law and hence, creates rights that 
are justiciable in municipal courts.27 Domestic courts in monist States, 
then, must “give effect to principles of international law over 
[superseding] or conflicting rules of domestic law.”28 
In those countries that follow the dualist approach to 
international law, the national legal system may consider “international 
law as binding between governments” but, “it may not be asserted by 
individual residents of the country in national courts unless the 
legislature or other branch of government makes it national law or 
regulation.”29 In these countries, international law and national law are 
considered separate and independent of each other. International law, 
it is argued, “prevails in regulating the relations between sovereign 
States in the international system, whereas municipal law takes 
precedence in governing national legal systems.”30 For international 
law to create rights that are justiciable in national courts, the national 
legislature or some other authority must incorporate, through explicit 
legislation, the provisions of the international instruments into 
domestic law.31 
                                               
 27 See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS & UNICEF, 
GUIDE TO THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN 
ARMED CONFLICT 24 (noting, inter alia, that “[i]n States with a ‘monist system’, the 
treaty is automatically incorporated into national law upon ratification”). 
 28 Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case Law: 
Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 103, 109 (2002). 
 29 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5. 
 30 Adjami, supra note 28, at 109. 
 31 See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS & UNICEF, supra 
note 27, at 24 (noting, inter alia, that “States with a ‘dualist’ system must incorporate 
the treaty into domestic law through explicit legislation to make the treaty locally 
enforceable”). 
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When making reference to “international law’s binding status 
in domestic legal systems,” international legal experts and international 
jurists have distinguished between “the types and sources of 
international law.”32 In general, international jurists consider 
international norms “that have attained the status of international 
customary law . . . to be part of municipal law under both the monist 
and dualist theories, and therefore prevail over national law even in 
domestic courts.”33 Some countries, such as the United Kingdom 
(“UK”), however, are not completely dualist in their approach to 
international law—as part of the European Union, the UK has 
“accepted all of European Union law as part of its national law which 
may be directly applied by the courts and administration.”34 
Unless a dualist State has internationalized its national 
constitution and created rights that are justiciable in municipal courts, 
violations of international law, including international human rights 
law, can only “be asserted at the international level.”35 It is important, 
then, especially for the recognition and protection of human rights, 
                                               
 32 Adjami, supra note 28, at 109. 
 33 Adjami, supra note 28, at 109. 
 34 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5. Of course, following a June 23, 2016 
referendum, 51.9% of British voters opted to leave the European Union. Her 
Majesty’s Government formally announced the country’s withdrawal from the EU 
in March 2017. That announcement started a two-year process that was supposed to 
cumulate in the UK withdrawing from the EU on March 29, 2019. The dateline was 
eventually extended to October 31, 2019. As of this writing, what is referred to as 
“Brexit,” a portmanteau of the words “British” and “exit”, has taken place—the UK 
officially left the EU on January 31, 2020 and effectively entered an eleven-month 
transition period. During this transition period, the UK will remain a member of the 
EU’s customs union and single market and will continue to obey all EU rules. 
Nevertheless, the UK will no longer have membership in all of the EU’s political 
institutions, including, for example, the EU Parliament. Negotiations between the 
UK and the EU are currently underway to agree on a treaty that will determine the 
nature of the trade relationship between the EU and the UK. By the end of January 
2021, the UK’s exit from the EU will effectively be completed, either with or without 
a trade deal. After that date, it is expected that EU law will no longer be applied 
directly by the courts and administration of the UK. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, Brexit: 
What Happens Now?, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-46393399 (last visited on Mar. 6, 2020). See also TIM OLIVER, EUROPE’S 
BREXIT: EU PERSPECTIVES ON BRITAIN’S VOTE TO LEAVE (2018) (examining, inter 
alia, the debate on the UK’s decision to leave the EU). 
 35 WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5. 
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that policymakers in each African country, particularly those which 
follow the dualist approach, enact explicit legislation to domesticate 
the various international human rights instruments and create rights 
that are directly justiciable in domestic courts. 
It is also important to note that the “effect of international law 
on a national system also hinges on the properties of international 
instruments themselves.”36 For example, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is generally considered “a hortatory declaration of 
principles and aspirations” and hence, it “does not have the legal status 
of a treaty.”37 However, since the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”) are international treaties, they are binding on all States 
Parties.38 
With respect to the recognition and protection of human rights 
in Africa, a few treaties are critical. First, is the African (Banjul) Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR” or “Banjul Charter”): the 
ACHPR is binding on all States Parties. According to article 1 of the 
ACHPR, the “parties to the present Charter [i.e., the ACHPR] shall 
recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and 
shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measure to give effect to 
them.”39 According to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, as of this writing (2020), fifty-four African Union 
                                               
 36 Adjami, supra note 28, at 110. 
 37 Adjami, supra note 28, at 110. 
 38 An international treaty’s binding effect can be traced to or stems from the 
principle in international law referred to as pacta sunt servanda. This principle is 
codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 26, which 
is titled “Pacta sunt servanda,” states as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex), concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969, art. 
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). 
 39 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on 
Oct. 21, 1986, art. 1. 
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Member States had ratified the ACHPR. The latest country to ratify 
the treaty was South Sudan, which did so on October 23, 2013.40 
The failure of a State Party to the ACHPR to adopt necessary 
measures to give effect to the provisions of the ACHPR, that is, to 
domesticate the ACHPR and create rights that are justiciable in the 
State Party’s domestic courts, is a breach of the Charter. Article 62 of 
the Charter imposes an obligation on States Parties to “undertake to 
submit every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into 
force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view 
to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed 
by the present Charter.”41 Many scholars of human rights in Africa 
have noted that “[t]he combined effect of articles 1 and 62 suggests 
that in light of resistance to the signing and ratification of the 
International Covenants, the drafters of the African Charter paid 
particular attention to ensuring the binding force of the Charter in 
national legal systems.”42 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Commission”) is the “primary human rights body on the 
African continent.”43 The African Commission’s “progressive 
interpretation of the Charter” has allowed it to give “guidance to states 
about the content of their obligations under the Charter,” and the 
                                               
 40 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table: 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49 (Oct. 4, 2019). The list of States that 
have ratified the ACHPR does not include Morocco, which withdrew from the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984 over the OAU’s recognition of the 
independence of the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Morocco returned to the 
African Union (the successor organization to the OAU) in 2017. See, e.g., Hamza 
Mohamed, Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years, AL JAZEERA NEWS, Jan. 31, 
2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-
33-years-170131084926023.html (Oct. 4, 2019). 
 41 Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 62. 
 42 Adjami, supra note 28, at 111. 
 43 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF 
PRETORIA & THE AFRICAN COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE AFRICAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM: CELEBRATING 30 YEARS SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE 
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 1986–2016, 8 (Pretoria 
University Law Press, 2016). 
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Charter’s “provisions have inspired domestic legislation.”44 In some 
African countries, “the Charter is an integral part of national law by 
virtue of the constitutional system in place.”45 For example, in their 
constitution, the people of the Republic of Bénin, make clear that the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which Bénin ratified on January 20, 1986, are an integral part of both 
the constitution and Béninese law. Specifically, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Bénin states as follows: 
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE, [r]eaffirm our 
attachment to the principles of democracy and human 
rights as they have been defined by the Charter of the 
United Nations of 1945 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the 
Organization of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 
20, 1986 and whose provisions make up an integral part of this 
present Constitution and of Béninese law and have a value 
superior to the internal law.46 
Since Bénin’s constitution makes the provisions of the African 
Charter “an integral part of” the country’s constitutional law, as well 
as “of Béninese law,” it has effectively created rights that are justiciable 
in the country’s domestic courts. Nigeria, a dualist country, however, 
enacted explicit legislation to “make the Charter part of domestic 
law.”47 
Second, is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (“African Children’s Charter”). The African Children’s 
Charter is also binding on States Parties. According to article 1, States 
Parties “shall recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrined in 
this Charter and shall undertake the necessary steps, in accordance with 
their Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present 
Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
                                               
 44 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 8–9. 
 45 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 9. 
 46 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN, 1990, at pmbl. Emphasis 
added. 
 47 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 9. 
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necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Charter.”48 The 
African Children’s Charter also addresses customary and traditional 
practices and states that “[a]ny custom, tradition, cultural or religious 
practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties, and obligations 
contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such 
inconsistency be discouraged.”49 
The African Children’s Charter was “inspired by several 
regional concerns germane to the continent of Africa and which were 
not covered by the African Charter of 1981.”50 Of particular 
importance to the drafters of the African Children’s Charter “were 
issues around child trafficking, use of child soldiers in armed conflicts, 
harmful cultural and traditional practices as well as several other 
[localized] anti-human rights practices within the domain of many 
African countries.”51 It was argued at the time that these issues had not 
been adequately “articulated by the African Charter [on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights] and existing international and regional bill of rights” 
and this “highlighted the need for a context-driven and context-
specific norm for the promotion and protection of the rights and 
welfare of the African Child.”52 Of particular note is the fact that the 
African Children’s Charter also established “the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child . . . within the OAU to 
promote and protect the rights stipulated in the African Children’s 
Charter.”53 
In the African countries, as is the case with countries in other 
parts of the world, “[a] State can, through its constitution, put to rest 
any doubts as to whether international law, including customary 
international law, is law within its national jurisdiction.”54 The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“S. Afr. Const.”), for 
example, directly addresses the applicability of both international law and 
                                               
 48 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), art. 1. 
 49 African Children’s Charter, supra note 48, art. 3. 
 50 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51. 
 51 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51. 
 52 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51. 
 53 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51. 
 54 Mbaku, supra note 25, at 72. 
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customary international law in the country’s domestic courts.55 Article 232 
of the S. Afr. Const. deals specifically with customary international law 
and states that “[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic [of 
South Africa] unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act 
of Parliament.”56 The issue of the applicability of international law in 
South African courts is dealt with in Article 233, which states that 
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.”57 
When South Africans undertook to design a constitution for 
themselves in the aftermath of the collapse of the dreaded apartheid 
system, they “voluntarily opted to allow international law to infringe 
on their sovereign right to determine the content of their constitutional 
law in an effort to enhance and improve the protection of human and 
peoples’ rights, as well as create, within the country, a culture that 
respects and protects human rights.”58 Many scholars have lauded 
South Africa’s emerging rights jurisprudence, particularly its 
application of international law.59 While provisions in the South 
African Constitution have significantly enhanced the ability of the 
country’s courts—particularly, the Constitutional Court—to develop a 
“body of human rights jurisprudence that has gained international 
prominence,”60 many other countries in the continent “do not provide 
such explicit approval of the use of international sources for domestic 
jurisprudence.”61 
Nevertheless, many African countries have been able to 
overcome the constraints that “nonincorporation would normally 
impose through their use of international human rights instruments as 
                                               
 55 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA NO. 108 OF 1996. 
This is the country’s permanent, post-apartheid constitution. 
 56 S. AFRI. CONST., 1996, supra note 55, § 232. 
 57 S. AFRI. CONST., 1996, supra note 55, § 232. 
 58 Mbaku, supra note 25, at 73. 
 59 Richard Cameron Blake, The World’s Law in One Country: The South African 
Constitutional Court’s Use of Public International Law, 115 S. AFR. L. J. 668 (1999). 
 60 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. 
 61 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. 
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persuasive authority in national court decisions.”62 For example, courts 
in Ghana, a country, which, unlike South Africa, has not provided 
through its constitution, “explicit approval of the use of international 
sources for domestic jurisprudence,”63 have overcome the obstacles 
brought about by nonincorporation by adopting what has been 
referred to as the “transjudicial model.”64 Adjami argues that “[t]he 
transjudicial model accounts for the actual use of international law and 
comparative case law in domestic courts, regardless of the binding or 
nonbinding status of their sources.”65 This approach to the 
interpretation of national constitutional law, it is argued, produces a 
“cross-fertilization of international law and comparative case law in 
domestic courts in continents around the globe,” including Africa.66 It 
is argued that transjudicialism has significantly improved dialogue 
across the world’s judicial systems, as well as, judicial comity.67 Below, 
we examine cases from a few African countries to determine how 
judges have utilized international and comparative law sources as tools 
for interpreting national constitutional law and legislative acts. 
A. Republic of Ghana 
Although Ghanaian courts, have, as a result of the country’s 
dualist approach to international law, “demonstrated some restraint in 
their articulation of international law rules and principles,” they have, 
nevertheless, been “striving to defeat the constraints imposed [on the 
                                               
 62 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. 
 63 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. 
 64 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of 
Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (noting, inter alia, that 
“transjudicial communication” can significantly strengthen international regimes, 
such as human rights treaties,” as well as, enhance the “dissemination of ideas from 
one national legal system to another, from one regional legal system to another, or 
from the international legal system or a particular regional legal system to national 
legal systems”). Slaughter, id. at 117. 
 65 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112–113. 
 66 Adjami, supra note 28, at 113. See also Slaughter, supra note 64, at 117–118 
(elaborating, inter alia, the concept of cross-fertilization). 
 67 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. See also The Honorable Claire L’Heureux-
Dubé, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15, 
40 (1998) (noting, inter alia, “the place of all courts in the global dialogue on human 
rights and other common legal questions”). 
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country’s legal system] by [the country’s] dualist posture in the course 
of adjudicating cases.”68 For example, in the case, New Patriotic Party v. 
Inspector General of Police,69 the Ghanaian Supreme Court was called upon 
to rule on the constitutionality of provisions of the Ghana Public 
Order Decree, 1972, which granted the Minister of the Interior, inter 
alia, the power to impose restrictions on the freedom of assembly, and 
whether individuals holding a meeting to celebrate a traditional custom 
should obtain prior “consent” or “permit” of the Minister of the 
Interior.70 
Ghana’s Supreme Court found that § 7 of the Public Order 
Decree, 1972, was in violation of the Constitution of Ghana, 
specifically, § 21, which defines “general fundamental freedoms,” 
which include “freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in 
processions and demonstrations.”71 The Court also determined that § 
7 of the Public Order Decree also violated article 11 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which guarantees the “right 
to assembly.”72 To the leading judgment of Hayfron-Benjamin, J., 
Archer, CJ., added the following declaration: 
Ghana is a signatory to [the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights] and Member States of the 
Organization of African Unity and parties to the 
Charter are expected to recognize the rights, duties and 
freedoms enshrined in the Charter and to undertake to 
adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to 
the rights and duties. I do not think the fact that Ghana 
has not passed specific legislation to give effect to the 
Charter, [means that] the Charter cannot be relied 
upon. On the contrary, Article 21 of our Constitution 
                                               
 68 Christian N. Okeke, The Use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of 
Ghana and Nigeria, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 409 (2015). 
 69 New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, [1993–94] 2 GLR 459 
SC (Nov. 30, 1993). 
 70 New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, supra note 69, at 459. 
See also Frans Viljoen, Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by 
Domestic Courts in Africa, 43 J. AFR. L. 1, 5 (1999). 
 71 CONST. OF GHANA, § 21(d). 
 72 AFRICAN (BANJUL) CHARTER, art. 11. 
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has recognized the right to assembly mentioned in 
Article 11 of the African [Banjul] Charter.73 
B. Republic of Botswana 
Courts in Botswana have also relied on international human 
rights instruments that have been ratified by Botswana to inform their 
interpretation of national constitutional provisions. In Attorney-General 
v. Unity Dow,74 Amissah, JP, writing for the Court of Appeal, noted that 
“[t]he learned judge a quo [had] referred to the international 
obligations of Botswana in his judgment in support of his decision that 
sex-based discrimination was forbidden under the Constitution [of 
Botswana].”75 Noting that the appellant had objected to the ruling of 
the judge a quo,76 Amissah, JP declared that “by the law of Botswana, 
relevant international treaties and conventions, may be referred to as 
an aid to interpretation.”77 The learned judge then cited to § 24 of 
Botswana’s Interpretation Act, which states that as “an aid to the 
construction of the enactment a court may have regard to . . . any 
relevant international treaty, agreement or convention.”78 
In objecting to the ruling of the judge a quo, the appellant, 
nevertheless, “conceded [to the Court of Appeal] that international 
                                               
 73 Quoted in Okeke, supra note 68, at 411–412. Also quoted in Viljoen, supra 
note 70, at 5. Also see Okeke, supra note 68, at 411–412. Viljoen cautions, however, 
that the reliance of the Ghanaian Supreme Court on the African (Banjul) Charter in 
New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police may “not necessarily form a pattern in 
judicial interpretation” in Ghana given the fact that “[i]n another decision handed 
down on the same day, New Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, pertaining 
to the right to information, no reference is made to the African Charter.” See Viljoen, 
supra note 70, at 6. Nevertheless, Viljoen notes that there is reason “for optimism 
about the increased role of the Charter in the fact that a high-ranking [Ghanaian] 
government official, the attorney-general, [had] referred to a provision of the Charter 
during a case.” See Viljoen, supra note 70, at 6. 
 74 Attorney-General v. Unity Dow, [1992] LRC (Const.) 623. 
 75 Attorney-General v. Unity Dow, 1992 BLR 119, 151 (CA). 
 76 That is the judgment of Horwitz, J of the High Court of Botswana in The 
Attorney-General of the Republic of Botswana v. Unity Dow, (Unreporter) MISCA 
124/90, June 3, 1990. 
 77 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151. 
 78 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151. 
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treaties and conventions may be used as an aid to interpretation.” 79 
However, he objected to the use, “by the learned judge, a quo of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women . . . on two 
grounds.”80 The first ground was that “none of [these treaties] had 
been incorporated into the domestic law by legislation, although 
international treaties became part of the law only when so 
incorporated”; and the second was that “treaties were only of 
assistance in interpretation when the language of the statute under 
consideration was unclear.”81 Amissah, JP, writing for the Court of 
Appeal, noted that “[a]ccording to the appellant’s argument, of the 
treaties referred to by the learned judge a quo, Botswana had ratified 
only the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but had not 
incorporated it into domestic law. That, the appellant admitted, 
however, did not deny that particular Charter the status of an aid to 
interpretation.”82 
The second objection offered by the appellant, stated Amissah, 
JP, “was that treaties were only of assistance in interpretation when the 
language of the statute under consideration was unclear.”83 In rejecting 
the appellant’s objections, Amissah, JP noted that: 
[e]ven if it is accepted that those treaties and 
conventions do not confer enforceable rights on 
individuals within the State until Parliament has 
legislated its provisions into the law of the land, in so 
far as such construction of enactments, including the 
Constitution, I find myself at a loss to understand the 
complaint made against their use in that manner in the 
interpretation of what no doubt are some difficult 
provisions of the Constitution.84 
                                               
 79 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151. 
 80 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151. 
 81 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151–152. 
 82 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151. 
 83 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151–152. 
 84 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 153. 
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Amissah, JP went on to state that: 
[t]he reference made by the judge a quo to these 
materials [i.e., international treaties and conventions to 
which Botswana is a State Party] amounted to nothing 
more than that. What he had said at p. A245c was: “I 
am strengthened in my view by the fact that Botswana 
is a signatory to the O.A.U. Convention on Non-
Discrimination. I bear in mind that signing the 
Convention does not give it the power of law in 
Botswana but the effect of the adherence by Botswana 
to the Convention must show that a construction of 
the section which does not do violence to the language 
but is consistent with and in harmony with the 
Convention must be preferable to a ‘narrow 
construction’ which results in a find that section 15 of 
the Constitution permits unrestricted discrimination 
on the basis of sex.”85 
With respect to the African (Banjul) Charter, Amissah, JP 
noted that Botswana is a signatory to the Charter and that the State is, 
in fact, “one of the credible prime movers behind the promotion and 
supervision of the Charter.”86 Amissah, JP then went on to concede 
that the African (Banjul) is not binding “within Botswana as legislation 
passed by its Parliament.”87 Nevertheless, domestic legislation in 
Botswana should be interpreted “so as not to conflict with Botswana’s 
obligations under the Charter or other international obligations.”88 
Amissah, JP concluded the discussion of the appellant’s objections by 
making the following observation: 
I am in agreement that Botswana is a member of the 
community of civilized States which has undertaken to 
abide by certain standards of conduct, and, unless it is 
impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its 
courts to interpret its legislation in a manner which 
                                               
 85 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154. 
 86 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 153. 
 87 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154 
 88 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154. 
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conflicts with the international obligations Botswana 
has undertaken. This principle, used as an aid to 
construction as is quite permissive under section 24 of 
the Interpretation Act, adds reinforcement to the view 
that the intention of the framers of the Constitution 
could not have been to permit discrimination purely on 
the basis of sex.89 
C. Republic of Namibia 
Namibia adopted a new constitution in February 1990,90 and 
formally became an independent country on March 21, 1990. 
Subsequently, on July 30, 1992, the Government of Namibia ratified 
the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.91 In 
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, the High Court of Namibia,92 a 
case brought before the Namibian High Court in 1994, the applicant, 
Elvis Kauesa, a warrant officer in the Namibian Police, questioned the 
constitutionality of “Reg. 58(2), which had been published under 
Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette 719 dated 14 
February 1964.”93 Specifically, Kausea sought: 
a declaratory order against the Minister of Home 
Affairs as first respondent, the Inspector-General of 
the Namibian Police as second respondent, and the 
Deputy Commissioner of the Namibian Police as third 
respondent, in the following terms: 
1. Declaring reg 58(32), published under 
Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette 
719 date 14 February 1964, to be invalid and 
without force and effect. 
                                               
 89 Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154. 
 90 CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, 1990 (WITH AMENDMENTS 2010). 
 91 African Union, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Status List, 
https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights (Oct. 7, 2019). 
 92 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, the High Court of 
Namibia, 1995 (1) 51 (NM). 
 93 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 53. 
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2. Ordering such respondents as may oppose this 
application to pay the costs thereof, jointly and 
severally. 
3. Granting the applicant such further and/or 
alternative relief as this honorable Court deems 
fit.94 
O’Linn, J., writing for the Court, started the analysis of the case 
by noting that “[w]hen considering the constitutionality of provisions 
of statute law, our Courts must in the first place rely on the Namibian 
Constitution, and not on that of other countries with constitutions 
fundamentally different.”95 The learned judge then added that “[a]fter 
all, art 1(6) [of the Constitution of Namibia] provides:96 ‘This 
Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia.’”97 
From the applicant’s “founding affidavit,” the Court 
determined that he relied “for his attack on the validity of the 
regulation on the ground that the regulation [Reg. 58(32)] is now in 
conflict with his ‘fundamental right’ to freedom of speech and 
expression expressed in art 21(1)(a) of the Constitution [of Nambia].” 98 
Kauesa, the applicant, asserted in his founding affidavit, that: 
I submit that I and other members of the police have 
the constitutionally protected right to engage in 
discussion or debate in a public sense on issue of such 
legitimate public concern about the administration of 
the force, conditions of service and other issues of 
public importance such as corruption or irregularities, 
even if such comment can be construed as 
unfavorable. In participating in the televised discussion 
                                               
 94 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 53. 
 95 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55. 
 96 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55. 
 97 CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art. 1(6). 
 98 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55. Article 21(a) of the Namibian Constitution 
states as follows: “All persons shall have the right to: (a) freedom of speech and 
expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media.” CONST. REP. 
OF NAMIBIA, art. 21(1)(a). 
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aforesaid, I respectfully submit that I was lawfully 
exercising this right.99 
O’Linn, J., cited to a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals of 
the Seventh Circuit and noted that in Choudry v. Jenkins,100 the majority 
“quoted without criticism . . . [a] dictum of Judge Grant in the Court a 
quo:101 ‘Open comment by a public employee which is false and made 
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth, 
constitutes an unpermissible form of expression.’”102 In analyzing the 
case, O’Linn, J., made reference to several international and national 
instruments, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,103 the European Convention on Human Rights,104 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,105 and the African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.106 Then, the learned 
judge moved on to deal with the issue of the applicability of 
international law and agreements in Namibian courts. In doing so, 
O’Linn J., went directly to Article 143 of the Constitution of Namibia, 
which provides that: “All existing international agreements binding 
upon Namibia shall remain in force, unless and until the National 
Assembly acting under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides.”107 
                                               
 99 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 57. 
 100 Choudry v. Jenkins, 559 F. 2d. 1085 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 101 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 70 
 102 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 70. Grant J.’s quote can be found at Choudry v. 
Jenkins, 559 F 2d 1085, 1088 (1977). 
 103 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 72. 
 104 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 75. 
 105 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 82. 
 106 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. 
 107 CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art. 143. Article 63(2)(d) deals with the power 
of the National Assembly in the post-independence period to deal with international 
obligations that were made on behalf of Namibia when it was a colony and was then 
known as South West Africa. Hence, Article 63(2)(d) states as follows: “The National 
Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject to this Constitution: d. 
to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international agreements 
as may have been entered into prior to independence by administrations within 
Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian people have historically not enjoyed 
democratic representation and participation.” See CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art. 
63(2)(d). 
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The learned judge then moved on to Article 144 of the 
Constitution of Namibia, which deals specifically with international 
law and which states that: 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act 
of Parliament, the general rules of public international 
law and international agreements binding upon 
Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the 
law of Namibia.108 
O’Linn, J., then noted that “[t]he Namibian Government [had], 
as far as can be established, formally recognized the African Charter in 
accordance with art 143 read with art 63(2)(d) of the Namibian 
Constitution.”109 As a consequence, argued O’Linn, J., “[t]he 
provisions of the Charter have therefore become binding on Namibia 
and form part of the law of Namibia in accordance with art 143, read 
with art 144 of the Namibian Constitution.”110 However, argued the 
learned judge, 
[i]t is questionable . . . whether the aforesaid 1982 
agreement and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights have become part of the law of Namibia. But, 
even if they are not, their provisions should carry weight when 
interpreting provisions of the Namibian Constitution, such as 
those which are relevant to the issues in this case and which are 
discussed or interpreted in the course of this judgment.111 
On this basis, the High Court rejected and dismissed the 
applicant’s application for a declaratory order with costs.112 Kauesa, 
however, appealed the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of 
Namibia.113 The Supreme Court began its analysis of the appeal by 
providing an overview of the judgment of the Court a quo. Of specific 
                                               
 108 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. 
 109 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. 
 110 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. 
 111 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. Emphasis added. 
 112 Kauesa, supra note 92, at 120. 
 113 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, (SA 5/94) [1995] NASC 3 (Oct. 11, 
1995). 
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interest to the appeal is the Court a quo’s judgment that “the 
Regulation [i.e., Reg. 58(32) of the Police Force] complies with the 
provisions of Article 21(2) of the Namibian Constitution in that it: (i) 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms contained in Sub-Article (1) of Article 21, including on the 
freedom of speech and expression; (ii) the restrictions are necessary in 
a democratic society; and (iii) are required in the interest of sovereignty 
and integrity of Namibia, national security and public order.”114 
The Supreme Court then examined judgments from courts in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, as well as, the 
European Court of Human Rights, on cases dealing with the 
suppression of free speech. Dumbutshena AJA, writing for the Court, 
made specific reference to the judgment delivered by Dickson CJ and 
Lamer and Wilson JJ of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case, Re 
Singh and Minister of Employment & Immigration and 6 Other Appeals,115 
which dealt with limitations on rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.116 
Dumbutshena AJA also cited to the European Court of 
Human Rights’ decision in the Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom,117 
and made specific reference to the following section in that judgment: 
The Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the 
utmost attention to the principles characterizing a 
“democratic society.” Freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and 
for the development of every man. Subject to 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10–2), it is applicable not 
only to “information” or “ideas” that are favorably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
                                               
 114 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 5. 
 115 Re Singh and Minister of Employment & Immigration and 6 Other 
Appeals, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177. 
 116 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 20–21. 
 117 Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 5493/72), 
Strasbourg, December 7, 1976. 
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disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no 
“democratic society.” This means, amongst other 
things, that every “formality,” “condition,” 
“restriction” or “penalty” imposed in this sphere must 
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.118 
Dumbutshena AJA then noted that: 
[i]n the context of Namibia freedom of speech is 
essential to the evolutionary process set up at the time 
of independence in order to rid the country of 
apartheid and its attendant consequences. In order to 
live in and maintain a democratic state the citizens 
must be free to speak, criticize and praise where praise 
is due. Muted silence is not an ingredient of democracy 
because the exchange of ideas is essential to the 
development of democracy.119 
The learned justice then went on to cite to several U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that deal specifically with limitations on “the 
right to free speech.”120 
Like the High Court, the Supreme Court of Namibia utilized 
international and comparative law sources as an aid in its interpretation 
of national constitutional law and declared “Regulation 58(32) 
published under Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette 
791, dated 14 February 1964 invalid and without force and effect in 
law.”121 The Court concluded that “Regulation 58(32) is in our view 
                                               
 118 Case of Handyside, supra note 117, at para. 49. Dumbutshena AJA also 
made reference to the European Court’s decision in The Sunday Times v. The United 
Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, App. No. 6538/74 (1979), a case that also dealt with 
issues of restrictions on individual rights and freedoms. 
 119 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 28. 
 120 Some of these include Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); 
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hamsphire, 315 U.S. 588 (1942); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405 (1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); New 
York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 121 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 40. 
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inconsistent with Article 21(1) and (2) of the Constitution [of Namibia] 
and we do not consider this to be a proper case to exercise the 
discretionary power conferred by Article 25(1)(a).”122 
D. Republic of South Africa 
In one of the earliest cases decided by the post-apartheid 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Court was called upon to 
decide on the constitutionality of the death penalty.123 Chaskalson P, 
in his leading judgment, made references to several international 
human rights instruments. The two individuals accused in this case 
were convicted “in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme 
Court on four counts of murder, one count of attempted murder and 
one count of robbery with aggravating circumstances.”124 The 
convicted persons were subsequently sentenced to death “on each of 
the counts of murder and to long terms of imprisonment on other 
counts.”125 They then appealed their convictions to the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed “the 
appeals against the sentences on the counts of attempted murder and 
robbery, but postponed the further hearing of the appeals against the 
death sentence until the constitutional issues are decided by this 
Court.”126 
Chaskalson P noted that the trial was concluded before South 
Africa’s Interim Constitution (1993) came into force and, as a 
consequence, “the constitutionality of the death sentence did not arise 
at the trial.”127 The learned justice also stated that “[i]t would have been 
better if the framers of the Constitution had stated specifically, either 
that the death sentence is not a competent penalty, or that it is 
permissible in circumstances permitted by law.”128 Since South Africa’s 
post-apartheid framers did not deal specifically with the death 
sentence, continued Chaskalson P, it was incumbent upon the 
                                               
 122 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 40. 
 123 The State v. Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3. 
 124 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 1. 
 125 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 1. 
 126 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3. 
 127 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 4. 
 128 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 5. 
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Constitutional Court (“CC”) “to decide whether the penalty is 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.”129 
The two issues raised in the appeal to the CC were: (1) “the 
constitutionality of section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and 
the implications of section 241(8) of the Constitution.”130 While no 
formal reference was made to the CC “in terms of section 102(6) of the 
Constitution,” Chaskalson P noted that “that was implicit in the 
judgment of the Appellate Division, and was treated as such by the 
parties.”131 
While South Africa’s 1993 Constitution was a transitional 
constitution, it was, nevertheless, one that established: 
a new order in South Africa; an order in which human 
rights and democracy are entrenched and in which the 
Constitution: “ . . . shall be the supreme law of the 
Republic and any law or act inconsistent with its 
provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly 
or by necessary application in this Constitution, be of 
no force and effect to the extent of the 
inconsistency.”132 
Chaskalson P then proceeded to examine other sections of the 
South African Interim Constitution that dealt with fundamental rights, 
as well as its own case law interpreting these rights.133 
Next, Chaskalson P examined international and comparative 
law sources dealing with the death penalty. The learned justice states 
that “[c]ustomary international law and the ratification and accession 
to international agreements is dealt with in section 231 of the 
Constitution which sets the requirements for such law to be binding 
                                               
 129 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 5. 
 130 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3. Emphasis in original. 
 131 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3. Emphasis in original. 
 132 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 7. 
 133 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 9. 
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within South Africa”134 and that “[i]n the context of section 35(1), public 
international law would include non-binding as well as binding law.”135 
Chaskalson P noted that international agreements and customary 
international law would be utilized as tools of interpretation.136 
Specifically, Chaskalson P noted that the 
[i]nternational agreements and customary international 
law accordingly provide a framework within which 
Chapter Three can be evaluated and understood, and 
for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with 
comparable instruments, such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on 
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of specialized 
agencies such as the International Labor Organization 
may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation 
of particular provisions of Chapter Three.137 
Public international law, argues Chaskalson P, does not 
prohibit capital punishment.138 International human rights 
instruments, the learned justice continued, “differ . . . from our 
Constitution in that where the right to life is expressed in unqualified 
terms they either deal specifically with the death sentence, or authorize 
exceptions to be made to the right to life by law.”139 This, continued 
the learned justice, “has influenced the way international tribunals have 
dealt with issues relating to capital punishment, and is relevant to a 
proper understanding of such decisions.”140 
                                               
 134 ACT NO. 200 OF 1993: CONST. REP. SOUTH AFRCA (INTERIM CONST.), § 
231. 
 135 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35. 
 136 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35. See also ACT NO. 200 OF 
1993, supra note 134, § 35(1). 
 137 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35. 
 138 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36. 
 139 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36. 
 140 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36. 
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The CC then moved on to examine several judicial decisions 
from the United States that deal with capital punishment and stated 
that “[t]he earliest litigation on the validity of the death sentence seems 
to have been pursued in the courts of the United States of America.”141 
Chaskalson P argues further that “[a]lthough challenges under state 
constitutions to the validity of the death sentence have been successful 
[in the United States], the federal constitutionality of the death 
sentence as a legitimate form of punishment for murder was affirmed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia.”142 
Chaskalson P states that in Gregg, Brennan, J., in a dissenting 
opinion, held that 
[t]he fatal constitutional infirmity in the punishment of 
death is that it treats “members of the human race as 
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. 
[It is] thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise 
of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a 
human being possessed of common human dignity.”143 
Chaskalson P then went on to state that “[t]he weight given to 
human dignity by Justice Brennan is wholly consistent with the values 
of our Constitution and the new order established by it. It is also 
consistent with the approach to extreme punishments followed by 
courts in other countries.”144 
Chaskalson P next turns to a decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (“FCC”) in a case involving life imprisonment 
and makes special note of a part of the decision dealing with “respect 
for human dignity.”145 In that case, Germany’s FCC noted that 
“[r]espect for human dignity especially requires the prohibition of 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments. [The state] cannot turn 
                                               
 141 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 40. 
 142 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 41. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976). 
 143 Gregg, supra note 142, at 230. 
 144 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 58. 
 145 [1977] 45 BVerfGE 187, 228. See S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at 
para. 59 
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the offender into an object of crime prevention to the detriment of his 
constitutionally protected right to social worth and respect.”146 
The fact that capital punishment, argues Chaskalson P, 
“constitutes a serious impairment of human dignity has also been 
recognized by judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court.”147 In Kindler 
v. Canada,148 the “appellant was found guilty of first degree murder, 
conspiracy to commit murder and kidnapping in the State of 
Pennsylvania and the jury recommended the imposition of the death 
penalty.”149 Nevertheless, before the court could impose the sentence, 
“the appellant escaped from prison and fled to Canada where he was 
arrested.”150 After the usual judicial proceedings, the Canadian Minister 
of Justice ordered that the appellant should be extradited to the United 
States “pursuant to s.25 of the Extradition Act without seeking 
assurances from the U.S., under Art. 6 of the Extradition Treaty 
between the two countries, that the death penalty would not be 
imposed or, if imposed, not carried out.”151 The appellant appealed the 
Minister’s decision, but both “the Trial Division and the Court of 
Appeal of the Federal Court dismissed appellant’s application to 
review the Minister’s decision.”152 The Supreme Court of Canada was 
called upon to “determine whether the Minister’s decision to surrender 
the appellant to the U.S., without first seeking assurances that the death 
penalty will not be imposed or executed, violates the appellant’s rights 
under s. 7 or s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”153 
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka and Cory JJ dissenting, dismissed the 
appeal and confirmed the extradition order. Nevertheless, in doing so, 
they noted that the death penalty is “the supreme indignity to the 
individual, the ultimate corporal punishment, the final and complete 
lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable castration. [It is] the 
                                               
 146 Quoted in S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 59. 
 147 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 60. 
 148 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1991) 2 SCR 779. 
 149 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. 
 150 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. 
 151 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. 
 152 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. 
 153 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. 
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ultimate desecration of human dignity.”154 Chaskalson P noted that in 
their ruling, 
the majority of the [Supreme Court of Canada] held 
that the validity of the order for extradition did not 
depend upon the constitutionality of the death penalty 
in Canada, or the guarantee in its Charter of Rights 
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Charter was 
concerned with legislative and executive acts carried 
out in Canada, and an order for extradition neither 
imposed nor authorized any punishment within the 
borders of Canada.155 
Chaskalson P went on to note that the issue in “Kindler’s case 
was whether the action of the Minister of Justice, who had authorized 
the extradition without any assurance that the death penalty would not 
be imposed was constitutional.”156 The learned justice then stated that: 
[i]n balancing the international obligations of Canada 
in respect of extradition, and another purpose of the 
extradition legislation—to prevent Canada from 
becoming a safe haven for criminals, against the 
likelihood that the fugitives would be executed if 
returned to the United States, the view of the majority 
was that the decision to return the fugitives to the 
United States could not be said to be contrary to the 
fundamental principles of justice.157 
The two fugitives, Ng and Kindler, then took their case to the 
UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) and argued “that Canada 
had breached its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.”158 While noting that “by definition, every 
execution of death may be considered to constitute cruel and inhuman 
                                               
 154 Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. This is the part of the judgment in Kindler 
that Chaskalson P relied on. 
 155 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 61. 
 156 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 62. 
 157 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 62. 
 158 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 63. 
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treatment within the meaning of article 7 of the [International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights],”159 the UNHRC also made 
reference to Article 6(2) of the Covenant, which permits, with some 
qualifications, the imposition of the death penalty “for the most 
serious crimes.”160 Chaskalson P then noted that 
[i]n view of these provisions, the majority of the 
[UNHRC] were of the opinion that the extradition of 
fugitives to a country which enforces the death 
sentence in accordance with the requirements of the 
International Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], 
should not be regarded as a breach of the obligations 
of the extraditing country.161 
From the examination of the cases of the two fugitives—Ng 
and Kindler—before the UN Human Rights Committee, Chaskalson 
P concluded that: 
[d]espite these differences of opinion, what is clear 
from the decisions of the Human Rights Committee of 
the United Nations is that the death penalty is regarded 
by it as cruel and inhuman punishment within the 
ordinary meaning of those words, and that it was 
because of the specific provisions of the International 
Covenant authorizing the imposition of capital 
punishment by member States in certain 
circumstances, that the words had to be given a narrow 
meaning.162 
Chaskalson P then moved on to examine decisions of cases 
decided under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The learned 
                                               
 159 Quoted in S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 63. See also Chitat Ng 
v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 
(1994), at para. 16.2. 
 160 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), art. 6(2). 
 161 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 64. 
 162 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 67. 
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justice made reference specifically to Soering v. United Kingdom.163 This 
case, like the Kindler case, involved the extradition to the United States, 
of a fugitive “to face murder charges for which capital punishment was 
a competent sentence.”164 Soering (i.e., the applicant), a West German 
national, had: 
alleged that the decision by UK Secretary State for the 
Home Department to extradite him to the United 
States of America to face trial in Virginia on a charge 
of capital murder would, if implemented, give rise to a 
breach by the United Kingdom of Article 3 [of the 
European Convention on Human Rights].165 
Chaskalson P noted that while Article 2 of the ECHR “protects 
the right to life,” it, nevertheless, “makes an exception in the case of 
‘the execution of a sentence of a court following [the] conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”166 The learned justice 
then noted that in Soering, the majority in the ECtHR “held that article 
3 could not be construed as prohibiting all capital punishment, since 
to do so would nullify article 2.”167 Nevertheless, argued Chaskalson P, 
it was 
competent to test the imposition of capital punishment 
in particular cases against the requirements of article 
3—the manner in which it is imposed or executed, the 
personal circumstances of the condemned person and 
the disproportionality to the gravity of the crime 
committed, as well as the conditions of detention 
awaiting execution, were capable of bringing the 
                                               
 163 Soering v. United Kingdom, Series A, No. 161; App. No. 14038/88; 
[1989] 11 EHRR 439. 
 164 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68. See also Soering, supra note 
163. 
 165 Soering, supra note 163, Headnote/Summary. Article 3 of the ECHR 
states as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AS AMENDED 
BY PROTOCOLS NOS. 11 AND 14, Nov. 1950, C.E.T.S. 5. 
 166 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68. 
 167 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68. 
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treatment or punishment received by the condemned 
person within the proscription.168 
Counsel for Soering argued that his extradition to the United 
States to face trial in the State of Virginia would expose him to the 
“risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by article 3 [of the 
European Convention on Human Rights].”169 This assessment was 
based on “the youth of the fugitive (he was eighteen at the time of the 
murders), an impaired mental capacity, and the suffering on death row 
which could endure for up to eight years if he were convicted.”170 
Soering, who was a national of Germany, was also liable to be tried in 
Germany for the same offense. Chaskalson P noted that: 
Germany, which has abolished the death sentence, also 
sought [the fugitive’s] extradition for the murders. 
There was accordingly a choice in regard to the country 
to which the fugitive should be extradited, and that 
choice should have been exercised in a way which 
would not lead to a contravention of article 3.171 
Chaskalson P then added that: 
[w]hat weighed with the [ECtHR] was the fact that the 
choice facing the United Kingdom was not a choice 
between extradition to a country which allows the 
death penalty and one which does not. We are in a 
comparable position. A holding by us that the death penalty for 
murder is unconstitutional, does not involve a choice between 
freedom and death; it involves a choice between death in the very 
few cases which would otherwise attract that penalty under section 
277(1)(a), and the severe penalty of life imprisonment.172 
Chaskalson P then moved on to an examination of case law on 
the death penalty from India. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 
                                               
 168 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68. 
 169 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69. 
 170 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69. 
 171 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69. 
 172 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69. Emphasis added. 
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permits the imposition of the death penalty for murder.173 
Nevertheless, Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides as 
follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.”174 The case Bachan 
Singh v. State of Punjab175 offered the Supreme Court of India the 
opportunity to test the constitutionality of § 302 of the Indian Penal 
Code. Nevertheless, the wording of Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India, argues Chaskalson P, represented an obstacle “to a challenge to 
the death sentence, because there was a ‘law’ which made provision for 
the death sentence.”176 In addition, argues Chaskalson P, 
article 72 of the Constitution [of India] empowers the 
President and Governors to commute sentences of 
death, and article 134 refers to the Supreme Court’s 
powers on appeal in cases where the death sentence 
has been imposed. It was clear, therefore, that capital 
punishment was specifically contemplated and 
sanctioned by the framers of the Indian Constitution, 
when it was adopted by them in November 1949.177 
The Indian Supreme Court then took a look at international 
authorities “for and against the death sentence, and with the arguments 
concerning deterrence and retribution.”178 After thoroughly reviewing 
arguments for and against the death sentence, the Court concluded 
that: 
 . . . the question whether or not [the] death penalty 
serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex 
and intractable issue. It has evoked strong, divergent 
views. For the purpose of testing the constitutionality 
of the impugned provision as to death penalty in 
                                               
 173 Section 302 of the Penal Code of India states that “Whoever commits 
murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be 
liable to fine.” THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 ACT NO. 45 OF 1860 (Oct. 6, 1860), 
§ 302. 
 174 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 21. 
 175 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. 
 176 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 72. 
 177 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 72. 
 178 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 76. 
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Section 302 of the Penal Code on the ground of 
reasonableness in the light of Articles 19 and 21 of the 
Constitution, it is not necessary for us to express any 
categorical opinion, one way or the other, as to which 
of these two antithetical views, held by the 
Abolitionists and Retentionists, is correct. It is 
sufficient to say that the very fact that persons of 
reason, learning and light are rationally and deeply 
divided in their opinion on this issue, is a ground 
among others, for rejecting the petitioners’ argument 
that retention of [the] death penalty in the impugned 
provision, is totally devoid of reason and purpose.179 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of India held that § 302 of 
the Indian Penal Code “violates neither the letter nor the ethos of 
Article 19.”180 Chaskalson P then noted that, after making this 
conclusion, the Court then proceeded to deal with Article 21 and 
argued that “if that article 21 were to be expanded in accordance with 
the interpretative principle applicable to legislation limiting rights 
under Article 19(1), article 21 would have to be read as follows: ‘No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according 
to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by a valid law.’”181 
In its expanded form, argued the Supreme Court of India, the 
State could deprive an individual of his or her life by “fair, just and 
reasonable procedure.”182 With respect to the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Chaskalson P noted that the provisions of 
that constitution are different from those of the Constitution of India. 
The learned justice then argued that: 
                                               
 179 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, para. 132. 
 180 Bachan Singh, supra note 179 at para. 132. 
 181 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 77. See also Bachan Singh, supra 
note 179, at para. 136. 
 182 Specifically, the Supreme Court of India held that “[t]hus expanded and 
read for interpretative purposes, Article 21 clearly brings out the implication, that the 
founding fathers recognized the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or 
personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure established by 
valid law.” Bachan Singh, supra note 179, at para. 136. 
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[t]he question we have to consider is not whether the 
imposition of the death sentence for murder is ‘totally 
devoid of reason and purpose’, or whether the death 
sentence for murder ‘is devoid of any rational nexus’ 
with the purpose and object of section 277(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. It is whether in the context of 
our Constitution, the death penalty is cruel, inhuman 
or degrading, and if it is, whether it can be justified in 
terms of section 33.183 
Chaskalson P noted that the Indian Penal Code “leaves the 
imposition of the death sentence to the trial judge’s discretion.”184 In 
Bachan Singh, the Court was also called upon to decide the 
“constitutionality of the legislation on the grounds of arbitrariness, 
along the lines of the challenges that have been successful in the United 
States.”185 In its decision, the Supreme Court of India “rejected the 
argument that the imposition of the death sentence in such 
circumstances is arbitrary, holding that a discretion exercised judicially 
by persons of experience and standing, in accordance with principles 
crystallized by judicial decisions, is not an arbitrary discretion.”186 
Chaskalson P then examined case law dealing with the 
limitation of rights in Canada,187 Germany,188 and under the European 
Convention.189 With respect to case law dealing with the limitation of 
rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights, the learned justice 
noted that “there are differences between [the Interim Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa]190 and the Canadian Charter which have 
a bearing on the way in which section 33 [of the Constitution of the 
                                               
 183 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 78. 
 184 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79. 
 185 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79. 
 186 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79. See also Bachan Singh, supra 
note 179, at para. 165. 
 187 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 104–107. 
 188 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 108. 
 189 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 109. 
 190 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993. 
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Republic of South Africa]191 should be dealt with.”192 Chaskalson P also 
noted that, “[t]his is equally true of the criteria developed by other 
courts, such as the German Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights.”193 The learned justice then made the 
following statement: 
”I see no reason this case . . . to attempt to fit our 
analysis into the Canadian pattern,” or for that matter 
to fit it into the pattern followed by any of the other 
courts to which reference has been made. Section 33 
prescribes in specific terms the criteria to be applied 
for the limitation of different categories of rights and 
it is in the light of these criteria that the death sentence 
for murder has to be justified.194 
After reexamining the decision of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa in the case at bar, the Constitutional 
Court (“CC”) concluded that: 
[t]he rights to life and dignity are the most important 
of all human rights, and the source of all other personal 
rights in Chapter Three [of the Interim Const. of the 
Rep. of South Africa].195 By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we 
are required to value these two rights above all others. 
And this must be demonstrated by the State in 
everything that it does, including the way it punishes 
criminals. This is not achieved by objectifying 
murderers and putting them to death to serve as an 
                                               
 191 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993, § 33. 
 192 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 110. Section 33 of the INTERIM 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, deals with limitations on the 
rights guaranteed by the constitution. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993, 
§ 33. 
 193 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 110. 
 194 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 110. Chaskalson P was 
quoting from the judgment written by Kentridge AJ in the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa’s case, S v. Zuma and Others (CCT5/94),[1995] ZACC 1; 1995 (2) SA 
642; 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA), at para. 35. 
 195 Chapter Three deals with “Fundamental Rights.” 
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example to others in the expectation that they might 
possibly be deterred thereby.196 
The CC then held as follows: 
1. In terms of section 98(5) of the Constitution,197 and 
with effect from the date of this order, the provisions 
of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of section 277(1) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, and all corresponding 
provisions of other legislation sanctioning capital 
punishment which are in force in any part of the 
national territory in terms of section 229, are declared to 
be inconsistent with the Constitution and, accordingly, 
to be invalid. 
In terms of section 98(7) of the Constitution, and 
with effect from the date of this order: 
(a) the State is and all its organs are forbidden to 
execute any person already sentenced to death 
under any of the provisions thus declared to be 
invalid; and 
(b) all such persons will remain in custody under 
the sentences imposed on them, until such 
sentences have been set aside in accordance with 
law and substituted by lawful punishments.198 
E. United Republic of Tanzania 
In 1990, the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza was called 
upon to decide a case, Ephrahim v. Pastory,199 which dealt with the rights 
of women under Haya Customary Law. In the case, a woman, Holaria 
Pastory, had inherited clan land from her father through a will.200 
                                               
 196 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 144. 
 197 This is the Interim Constitution (1993). 
 198 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 151. 
 199 Ephrahim v. Pastory (1990) LRC (Const.) 757; (2001) AHRLR 236 
(TzHC 1990). 
 200 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1. 
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Pastory later sold the clan land to one Gervazi Kaizilege, who was 
considered by Pastory’s clan as a stranger and non-member.201 A day 
after Pastory finalized the sale of the clan land, one Bernardo 
Ephrahim, a relative of Pastory’s, “filed a suit at Kashasha Primary 
Court in Muleba District, Kagera Region, praying for a declaration that 
the sale of the clan land by his aunt, . . . was void as females under 
Haya Customary Law have no power to sell clan land.”202 
Ephrahim’s position was in line with the Haya Customary Law 
(Declaration) (No. 4) Order of 1963, which provides at paragraph 20 
that “[w]omen can inherit, except for clan land, which they may receive 
in usufruct but may not sell. However, if there is no male of that clan, 
women may inherit such land in full ownership.”203 The Primary Court 
agreed with Ephrahim, declared the sale null and void and asked 
Pastory to refund the money paid on the property to the purchaser.204 
Pastory then appealed the Primary Court’s decision to the 
District Court at Muleba and the latter quashed the decision of the 
Primary Court, stating that that ruling had been in violation of the Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 
which granted all citizens—men and women—equality before the 
law.205 Dissatisfied with the District Court’s decision, Ephrahim 
appealed it to the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza.206 
Mwalusanya J, who wrote the decision for the High Court, 
began the analysis of the case by noting that Haya Customary Law is 
clear on the issue before the Court since it is codified “in the Laws of 
Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law, 1963” (Tanzania).207 
Under Haya Customary Law, Mwalusanya J noted, “females can inherit 
clan land which they can use in usufruct . . . [b]ut they have no power 
                                               
 201 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1. The sale of the clan land 
was finalized on August 24, 1988. 
 202 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1. 
 203 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2. 
 204 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2. 
 205 See THE CONST. UNITED REP. TANZANIA, Part III (Basic Rights and 
Duties). 
 206 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199. 
 207 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2. 
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to sell it, otherwise the sale is null and void.”208 The learned judge 
noted, however, that there is precedent in Tanzanian case law that 
courts in matters such as those before the High Court, are bound by 
customary law.209 
Mwalusanya J, argues, however, that since the Bill of Rights 
was incorporated into the constitution in 1984, “female clan members 
[now] have the same rights as male clan members.”210 Unfortunately, 
declared the learned judge, Haya Customary Law has not been changed 
despite the incorporation of a Bill of Rights into the country’s 
constitution and subsequent guarantee of equality of women to their 
men-folk. He noted, specifically, that “[w]hat is more is that since the 
Bill of Rights was incorporated in our 1977 Constitution [vide Act no. 
15 of 1984], by Article 13(4), discrimination against women has been 
prohibited.”211 
Mwalusanya J then made note of various international human 
rights instruments that the United Republic of Tanzania has ratified 
and which outlaw discrimination, particularly against women. The 
learned judge states, for example, that “Tanzania has also ratified the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, which in article 
18(3) prohibits discrimination on account of sex.”212 In addition, 
Mwalusanya J argues, “Tanzania has ratified the International 
                                               
 208 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 3. 
 209 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 3. 
 210 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 5. See also Chris Maina Peter, 
Five Years of the Bill of Rights in Tanzania: Drawing a Balance-Sheet, 4 AFR. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 131 (1992) (examining, inter alia, the incorporation of a Bill of Rights into 
Tanzania’s Constitution). The Bill of Rights specifically provides that: “(1) All human 
beings are born free, and are all equal. (2) Every person is entitled to recognition and 
respect for his dignity.” CONST. UNITED REP. TANZANIA, art. 12(1–2). “All persons 
equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to protection and 
equality before law. No law enacted by any authority in the United Republic of 
Tanzania shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its 
effect.” CONST. UNITED REP. TANZANIA, art. 13(1–2). 
 211 Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 10. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which in article 26 
prohibits discrimination based on sex.”213 The judge then declares that: 
The principles enunciated in the above-named 
documents214 are a standard below which any civilized 
nation will be ashamed to fall. It is clear from what I 
have discussed that the customary law under 
discussion flies in the face of our Bill of Rights as well 
as the international conventions to which we are 
signatories.215 
After determining that the Haya Customary Law (Declaration) 
(No. 4) Order of 1963 was unconstitutionally discriminatory against 
women, he then turned to an examination of the case at bar in order 
to determine the appropriate remedy. First, he made reference to § 5(1) 
of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1984 and various academic writings on § 5(1), which 
“hold[] the view that courts in Tanzania can modify discriminatory 
customary law in the course of statutory interpretation.”216 
Further, as provided by § 5(1) of the Constitution 
(Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, 
with effect from March 1988, Tanzania’s domestic courts must 
construe existing law, including customary law, “[w]ith such 
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be 
necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Fifth 
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1984, i.e., the Bill of Rights.”217 
Mwalusanya J adopted a purposive approach to constitutional 
interpretation and determined that in enacting § 5(1) and the Bill of 
Rights, it was the intention of the Parliament of the United Republic 
of Tanzania to “do away with all oppressive and unjust laws of the 
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past.”218 Parliament, Mwalusanya J noted, “wanted all existing laws (as 
they existed in 1984) which were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights to 
be inapplicable in the new era or be treated as modified so that they 
would be in line with the Bill of Rights. It wanted the courts to modify 
by construction those existing laws which were inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights such that they were in line with the new era.”219 
Next, Mwalusanya J looked for guidance from the experiences 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe after the country introduced its Bill of 
Rights into its constitution.220 The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
Mwalusanya J noted, also has a similar provision like Tanzania’s § 5(1) 
of Act 16 of 1984.221 The learned justice then briefly examined a case 
from the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Bull v. Minister of Home Affairs, 
which dealt with limitations on the right to liberty guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights,222 and concluded that the case was “persuasive authority 
for the proposition of law that any existing law that is inconsistent with 
the Bill of Rights should be regarded as modified such that the 
offending part of that statute or law is void.”223 
Judge Mwalusanya then held as follows: 
I have found as a fact that section 20 of the Rules of 
Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law, 
1963, is discriminatory of females in that, unlike their 
male counterparts, they are barred from selling clan 
land. That is inconsistent with article 13 (4) of the Bill 
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of Rights of our Constitution which bars 
discrimination on account of sex. Therefore under 
section 5(1) of Act 16 of 1984 I take section 20 of the 
Rules of Inheritance to be now modified and qualified 
such that males and females now have equal rights to 
inherit and sell clan land. Likewise the Rules 
Governing the Inheritance of Holdings by Female 
Heirs (1944) made by the Bukoba Native Authority, 
which in rules 4 and 8 entitle a female who inherits self-
acquired land of her father to have usufructuary rights 
only (rights to use for her lifetime only) with no power 
to sell that land, is equally void and of no effect.224 
Additionally, Mwalusanya J declared as follows: 
From now on, females all over Tanzania can at least 
hold their heads high and claim to be equal to men as 
far as inheritances of clan land and self-acquired land 
of their fathers is concerned. It is part of the long road 
to women’s liberation. But there is no cause for 
euphoria as there is much more to do in the other 
spheres. One thing which surprises me is that it has 
taken a simple, old rural woman to champion the cause 
of women in this field and not the elite women in town 
who chant jejune slogans for years on end on women’s 
liberation, but without delivering the goods.225 
The various African courts that we have examined were faced 
with important legal conflicts, which concerned the existence of laws 
that conflict with their countries’ modernized constitutions,226 and by 
implication, international human rights instruments. These courts also 
operate in countries that have not yet internationalized their national 
constitutional law—while many of these countries have ratified a 
number of international human rights instruments, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as, the 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, they have not 
yet domesticated the provisions of these international instruments. In 
other words, they have not yet enacted the necessary legislation to 
make the provisions of these instruments part of national 
constitutional law. As a consequence, the provisions of these 
international instruments do not represent rights that are justiciable in 
the domestic courts of many of these African countries. 
Nevertheless, many of the courts that we have examined have 
recognized the role that they can play to bring domestic laws, including 
customary law, into conformity with provisions of their national 
constitutions, as well as, those of relevant international human rights 
instruments. Reliance on various international human rights 
instruments has allowed domestic courts in Africa, such as the High 
Court of Tanzania, to invalidate customary law that conflicts with the 
Bill of Rights. Other African courts have used the provisions of 
international human rights instruments as a tool to interpret national 
constitutions and legislative acts and bring them in conformity with 
international human rights law. These courts have come to the 
realization that the failure by their national legislatures to enact 
necessary legislation to domesticate international human rights 
instruments to which their countries are States Parties does not mean 
that the provisions of these instruments cannot be made relevant to 
the protection of human rights in these countries. 
As argued by several international law experts, “[w]here States 
have failed to abolish or reform customary laws that discriminate 
against women and children and other historically marginalized 
groups, judges can use their interpretive powers to strike down or 
modify discriminatory customary law provisions and generally bring all 
law into conformity with the provisions of international human rights 
instruments.”227 In fact, as more African countries reform their 
institutions and provide themselves with independent judiciaries, there 
is likely to emerge in these countries “a progressive and global 
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approach to interpreting constitutional rights,”228 a development 
which, it is argued, “could significantly enrich national or domestic 
constitutional law.”229 
On December 16, 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) and it came into effect on January 3, 1976.230 The 
ICESCR is a multilateral treaty, which committed States Parties to 
“undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
. . . Covenant.”231 As of October 2019, most African countries have 
ratified the treaty.232 In most of these countries, ratification, however, 
has not created rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. In order 
for each of these States Parties to the ICESCR to create rights that are 
justiciable in domestic courts, they must amend their national 
constitutions and provide a “supremacy clause,” such as that present 
in the U.S. Constitution.233 The Supremacy Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution reads as follows: 
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.234 
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With such a clause, once the treaty is ratified by the country’s 
legislature, its provisions become rights that are justiciable in domestic 
courts. A country can also directly insert provisions of the treaty in 
question into its national constitution, effectively making the rights 
contained in the treaty both an integral part of the constitution and of 
the country’s laws. Beyond this, how effect is given to international 
instruments in a particular African country is dependent on whether 
the country follows the monist or dualist approach to international law. 
In “[m]onist legal systems, where international law is 
incorporated directly into the domestic legal system,” allowance is 
made “for the immediate domestic application of international 
treaties.”235 In countries that follow the dualist approach to 
international law, the latter is “not automatically part of domestic law” 
and additional “steps are needed to incorporate it into national law.”236 
Nevertheless, even in countries in which international treaties can only 
apply when national legislatures have either incorporated the content 
of the treaty into the national constitution or made reference to it in 
the national constitution, judges “have developed more creative ways 
of making use of international standards.”237 For example, before 
South Africa finally ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights on January 12, 2015, its courts were already 
using the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) to “interpret the ESC rights enshrined 
in the South African Constitution.”238 
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In the following sections, we use case law from the Republic 
of South Africa to show how judges can find creative ways to use 
international human rights instruments to interpret the economic, 
social and cultural rights enshrined in their national constitutions, as 
well as, adjudicate cases about these rights, even if the provisions of 
these international human rights instruments have not yet been 
domesticated by their national legislatures. 
II. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A. Introduction 
South African constitutional and human rights experts have 
noted that “[t]he constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa has to be seen in the context of the debate that has often 
characterized the justiciability of such rights.”239 That debate eventually 
came to an end, for at least two reasons. First, the Constitutional 
Assembly saw fit to include socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, 
making them directly justiciable in the country’s courts.240 Second, the 
Constitutional Court (“CC”), the country’s highest court, has since 
held that socio-economic rights are justiciable. For example, in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and 
Others,241 Yacoob J, writing for the Court, noted that “[w]hile the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights has been the subject of 
considerable jurisprudential and political debate, the issue of whether 
socio-economic rights are justiciable at all in South Africa has been put 
beyond question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the 
Certification judgment.”242 The learned justice then quoted from the 
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Certification judgment.243 In response to a question regarding whether 
socio-economic rights are justiciable in South African courts, the Court 
in In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
held as follows: 
[T]hese rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable. 
As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of 
the civil and political rights entrenched in the 
[constitutional text before this Court for certification 
in that case] will give rise to similar budgetary 
implications without compromising their justiciability. 
The fact that socio-economic rights will almost 
inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem 
to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very 
minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively 
protected from improper invasion.244 
During the post-apartheid constitution-making process, there 
arose questions regarding whether socio-economic rights could be 
enforced by the courts.245 In addition, it was argued further that “the 
protection of such rights should be a task for the legislature and 
executive and that constitutionalizing them would have the inevitable 
effect of transferring power from these two branches of government 
to the judiciary, which lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary to 
make decisions concerning allocation of social and economic 
resources.”246 However, South Africans who argued in favor of the 
constitutional guarantee of socio-economic rights “pointed out that it 
makes little sense to tell people that their civil and political rights will 
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be protected, if they continue to be at the mercy of the elements and 
of social exploitation.”247 
Some constitutional scholars have argued that “[s]ocio-
economic rights are a central terrain in new democracies,”248 such as 
South Africa’s, and that while they are “[o]ften deemed essential for 
the legitimacy of the constitution at the time of adoption, they are 
subject to downstream pressures at the implementation stage as 
governments confront limited budgets and the need for 
macroeconomic credibility.”249 Including socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights, it was argued by some South Africans, would raise “the 
[specter] of angry and disillusioned people holding up the Constitution 
and asking whether this is what the struggle [against apartheid] was all 
about.”250 
Then, there was the argument that proper adjudication of 
socio-economic rights “requires an assessment of fundamental social 
values that can only be carried out legitimately by the political branches 
of government, and [that] the proper enforcement of socio-economic 
rights requires significant government resources that can only be 
adequately assessed and balanced by the legislature.”251 It was also 
argued that “[j]udges and courts . . . lack the political legitimacy and 
institutional competence to decide such matters.”252 
In the end, socio-economic rights were entrenched in South 
Africa’s permanent post-apartheid constitution—Constitution of the 
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Republic of South Africa, 1996.253 The debate then moved on to what 
role judges would play in the implementation and enforcement of these 
rights. The International Commission of Jurists has noted that 
[i]n cases where different legal interpretations are 
possible, if duties or prohibitions regarding [economic, 
social and cultural] rights are part of the legal system, 
and especially of the superior layers of the legal system, 
assigning judges a role in the enforcement of these 
norms is absolutely compatible with the traditional 
functions performed by the judiciary.254 
Of course, constitutionally guaranteeing socio-economic rights 
imposes a duty on the government of South Africa to find ways to 
realize these rights. Given the universal problem of scarcity, it is most 
likely the case that, in enacting legislation to realize the rights 
guaranteed by the constitution, which include socio-economic rights, 
there is bound to arise issues of “equity,” “reasonableness,” 
“proportionality,” etc., all of which are within the purview of the 
judiciary.255 
As South Africans engaged in national discourse about the 
constitutional principles that were expected to form the foundation for 
their permanent post-apartheid constitution and serve as a constraint 
on the constitutional drafters (i.e., the Constitutional Assembly), 
constitutional and legal scholars floated four options, which they 
believed, could help resolve the various issues associated with the 
guarantee of socio-economic rights. These included: 
(1) the full recognition of socio-economic rights as 
justiciable rights without any qualifications; 
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(2) including socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights 
as justiciable rights; 
(3) merely listing them as non-justiciable principles of 
state policy; or 
(4) not making any reference to these rights at all.256 
South Africa’s first post-apartheid constitution, the Interim or 
Transitional Constitution, was designed to enhance and facilitate 
governance while the Constitutional Assembly drafted the permanent 
constitution.257 During South Africa’s multi-party constitutional 
negotiation process, which took place between 1990 and 1993, “the 
ANC (“African National Congress”)258 and like-minded parties wished 
a democratically elected constituent assembly to have an almost free 
hand in drafting the Bill of Rights, and therefore argued for as minimal 
a protection of rights in the interim constitution as possible.”259 The 
ANC and its supporters were of the view that the multi-party 
constitutional negotiations were expected to produce an interim 
constitution that would facilitate and enhance transition to democratic 
rule and that a democratically elected Constituent or Constitutional 
Assembly, empowered by the people, would draft the Bill of Rights. 
As a consequence, the ANC “required protection for the most basic 
civil and political rights, those essential to a process of ‘free and fair 
elections’” and which would be found in most of the world’s 
democratic constitutions.260 The democratically elected Constituent 
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Assembly, which was empowered to draft the country’s permanent 
post-apartheid constitution, would then be left to decide how to 
protect socio-economic rights. 
Thus, the Interim Constitution dealt primarily with what were 
considered largely uncontroversial rights—political and civil rights. 
Hence, while there was an exhaustive list of political and civil rights, 
the list of economic, social and cultural rights was relatively limited. 
Section 27 (labor rights) enshrined various labor rights, including, for 
example, the right of labor “to strike for the purpose of collective 
bargaining;”261 section 25 guaranteed the right of “[d]etained, arrested 
and accused persons to be detained under conditions consonant with 
human dignity, which shall include at least the provision of adequate 
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense”;262 
section 30 guaranteed children the right “to security, basic nutrition 
and basic health and social services”;263 and section 32 guaranteed that 
“[e]very person shall have the right to basic education and to equal 
access to educational institutions.”264 
The decision regarding the inclusion of socio-economic rights 
in the final and permanent constitution was left to be decided by the 
Constitutional Assembly (“CA”), the drafters of that constitution. By 
entrenching socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution), the CA effectively recognized them as human rights, 
on the same level as civil and political rights.265 Nevertheless, the CA 
decided that “extensive internal limitations would apply in respect of 
most aspects of these rights, to restrict the obligations placed on the 
[South African] state.”266 Since these were rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, they were directly justiciable in the country’s courts. 
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Two institutions were granted the power to enforce these 
rights—the courts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
(“SAHRC”).267 Since the socio-economic rights guaranteed by the 
constitution were justiciable in the nation’s courts, a citizen-litigant 
could directly and indirectly invoke them. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that the SAHRC’s “decisions are not legally binding,” meaning 
that the protection of these rights by the SAHRC is only “soft 
protection.”268 In addition, the role played by South Africa’s courts and 
the South African Human Rights Commission must be seen in “the 
context of and in interaction with the role of those institutions with an 
implicit, but vital function in the process of implementing socio-
economic rights, such as the legislature, elected by popular 
franchise.”269 
Post-apartheid South Africa’s situation, particularly with 
respect to the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights, is 
considered exemplary. First, it is one of the few countries whose 
constitution has recognized socio-economic rights as human rights and 
entrenched them in the country’s Bill of Rights. Second, “[a]lthough 
some other countries’ constitutions enumerate socio-economic rights, 
few countries’ courts have found such rights to be fully and directly 
justiciable, and even fewer have multiple, affirmative social rights 
opinions. No other country has developed their case law sufficiently 
to outline a comprehensive jurisprudence.”270 
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Proponents of the justiciability of socio-economic rights 
consider South Africa’s role as “revolutionary and heroic” while 
“detractors” see South Africa’s role as “irresponsible and doomed.”271 
Some scholars have suggested that guidance could be obtained from 
examining case law from various jurisdictions around the world, while 
others have argued in favor of seeking guidance from “the 
jurisprudence which has been developed on the level of international 
law.”272 In fact, they argue that “legal protection for socio-economic 
rights, . . . , largely has its roots in international law.”273 However, an 
examination of South African court adjudications of cases involving 
socio-economic rights reveals “a [Constitutional] Court that has been 
both less revolutionary and less irresponsible than commentators 
expected (and continue to allege).”274 Christiansen goes on to argue 
that 
[t]his is because the Court’s jurisprudence has 
incorporated the concerns of the jurists who argue that 
courts lack the legitimacy and competence to decide 
such matters, even while the Court is performing the 
affirmative review and remediation functions desired 
by the jurists who favor enforcement of social rights. 
The Court maintains an affirmative social rights 
jurisprudence tempered by internalized justiciable 
concerns.275 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) is the primary UN human rights instrument that 
deals with socio-economic rights.276 South Africa signed the ICESR on 
                                               
 271 Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323. 
 272 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 156. 
 273 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 156. 
 274 Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323. 
 275 Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323–324. 
 276 See, e.g., PROGRAM ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS (NEW DELHI), HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL: INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (New Delhi, India, 2015), 
http://www.pwescr.org/PWESCR_Handbook_on_ESCR.pdf (Dec. 11, 2019). See 
also INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
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October 3, 1994, and ratified it on January 12, 2015.277 There are, of 
course, other international human rights instruments with provisions 
that guarantee the protection of socio-economic rights. For example, 
articles 22–26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
guarantees various socio-economic rights, including, for example, the 
“right to social security,” “the right to work,” “the right to equal pay 
for equal work,” “the right to rest and leisure,” “the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family,” the right of children, regardless of the nature of their birth, to 
enjoy all the protections granted to others, and “the right to 
education.”278 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) also has provisions that 
guarantee socio-economic rights, specifically for women. For example, 
article 3 states as follows: 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the 
political, social, economic and cultural fields, all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure 
the full development and advancement of women, for 
the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
on a basis of equality with men.279 
The Republic of South Africa signed the CEDAW on January 
29, 1993, and ratified it on December 15, 1995.280 South Africa is also 
                                               
 277 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 19, 2019 (STATUS OF TREATIES), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 19, 2019). 
 278 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, UNGA Res. 217A(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
 279 CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (Dec. 18, 1979), art. 3. See 
also arts. 10–14. 
 280 CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: STATUS AS OF OCTOBER 19, 2019 (STATUS OF 
TREATIES), 
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a State Party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,281 
which also has provisions that protect socio-economic rights. South 
Africa signed the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on July 9, 1996, and ratified it on the same day.282 The Banjul 
Charter has provisions that guarantee both civil and political, as well 
as social and economic rights.283 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“CESCR”)284 is the international institution empowered and charged 
with supervising compliance by States Parties to the ICESCR. States 
Parties are supposed to send regular reports to the CESCR on how 
they are realizing the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR. Although these 
reports are supposed to be submitted by the governments of the States 
                                               
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 19, 2019). 
 281 CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov.20, 
1989). See generally arts. 4, 6(2), 19, 20, 24, 26–29, and 31. 
 282 OAU/AU TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS & CHARTERS, 
https://au.int/en/treaties (Oct. 19, 2019). 
 283 The Banjul Charter recognizes the right to work (Article 15), the right to 
health (Article 16), and the right to education (Article 17). Through its decision in 
SERAC v. Nigeria, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
interpreted the Banjul Charter to include a right to housing and a right to food, the 
right to health, and the right to development. See African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and 
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria (Communication No. 
155/96), https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/social-and-economic-rights-
action-center-center-economic-and-social-rights-v-nigeria (Dec. 11, 2019). 
 284 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is “a body of 
18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States [P]arties.” See Office of the UN 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (Oct. 19, 2019). 
The Committee was established under ECOSOC Res. 1985/17 (May 28, 1985) and 
charged with carrying out the monitoring of the functions assigned to the United 
National Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) in Part IV of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Part IV covers arts. 16–25. 
According to art. 16, “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which 
they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights 
recognized herein.” INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 18, 1966), art. 16. 
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Parties, in practice, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
working on development and human rights issues also submit what are 
referred to as “shadow reports” which are considered an integral part 
of the CESCR reporting system and an important input into the 
CESCR’s country review process.285 
Since it came into being in 1985, the CESCR has issued several 
General Comments on the ICESCR, “which have developed the 
normative content of [economic, social and cultural] rights and State 
obligations since the 1990s.”286 For example, the CESCR issued its first 
general comment on July 27, 1981, titled CESCR General Comment No. 
1: Reporting by States Parties.287 This comment explains the reporting 
system and elaborates on the system’s seven objectives. The initial 
report, which each State Party was required to submit within “two 
years of the Covenant’s entry into force for the State Party concerned,” 
was to ensure that “a comprehensive review is undertaken with respect 
to national legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and 
practices in an effort to ensure the fullest possible conformity with the 
Covenant.”288 
                                               
 285 See, e.g., International Women’s Rights Action Watch, NGO Shadow 
Reporting to CESCR: A Procedural Guide (June 2003), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/shadow/CESCRNGOguideJune2003.pdf (Dec. 
11, 2019); See also Rukmini Datta & Program on Women’s Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, New Perspectives on NGO Reporting to the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Challenges and Opportunities, 
http://www.pwescr.org/PWESCRPaperPR-Revised_8-9-2012%5B1%5D.pdf 
(Dec. 11, 2019) & International Commission of Jurists, Overview of the Periodic Reporting 
Process of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, International Commission of Jurists Background 
Note, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TreatyBodies-
PeriodicReporting.pdf (Dec. 11, 2019). 
 286 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Influence of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, 64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 259, 263 (2017). 
 287 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General 
Comment No. 1: Reporting by States Parties, Adopted at the Thirteenth Session of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, July 27, 1981, UN Doc. 
E/1989/22 (July 27, 1981), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838b2.html (Oct. 
19, 2019). 
 288 CESCR General Comment No. 1, supra note 287, para. 1. 
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B. The South African Constitution and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
The rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ESC rights”) can only be 
realized on the territory of the States Parties to the Covenant. As of 
October 2019, one hundred seventy (170) countries have ratified the 
ICESCR and hence, are States Parties to the Covenant.289 Each State 
Party is under obligation to “take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including the adoption 
of legislative measures.”290 
The first step that States Parties should take in order help them 
effectively realize ESC rights is for each of them to incorporate these 
rights into their national constitutions and make them part of their 
constitutional law. By doing so, States Parties make the incorporated 
ESC rights directly justiciable in their domestic courts and grant 
aggrieved citizens the standing to make a claim before the courts for a 
remedy.291 The process of domesticating ESC rights can involve 
explicitly listing all these rights in the constitution (e.g., in the Bill of 
Rights) or by inserting in the national constitution, a phrase that makes 
the treaty (i.e., the ICESCR) part of the State Party’s constitutional law. 
For example, according to Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya, 
“[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law 
of Kenya under this Constitution.”292 Since Kenya ratified the ICESCR 
on May 1, 1972, and taking into consideration Article 2(6) of the 
                                               
 289 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 20, 2019 (STATUS OF TREATIES), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 20, 2019). 
 290 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966), art. 2(1). 
 291 See Evan Rosevear, Ran Hirschl & Courtney Jung, Justiciable and 
Aspirational Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, in THE FUTURE OF 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 37 (Katharine G. Young ed., 2019) (examining, 
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 292 CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(6). 
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Constitution, the ESC rights are, in principle, part of the laws of Kenya 
and hence, are justiciable in Kenyan courts.293 
South Africa is one of the few African countries that have 
directly incorporated all or some of the ESC rights into their national 
constitutions. The constitution that South Africans ratified and 
adopted in 1996 was part of a national effort to deal with the injustices 
of their racialized past and provide a foundation for the construction 
of a non-racial democratic governance system. For example, the 
Preamble to the Constitution begins with the following words: 
We, the people of South Africa, 
Recognize the injustices of our past; 
Honor those who suffered for justice and freedom in 
our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop 
our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
united in our diversity.294 
Those injustices of the past included the denial of economic, 
social and cultural rights to the country’s majority African groups. It is 
no wonder that the architects of the country’s post-apartheid 
                                               
 293 In ratifying the ICESCR, Kenya made some declarations and 
reservations. Upon ratification, Kenya made the following statement: “While the 
Kenya Government recognizes and endorses the principles laid down in paragraph 
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2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
638 
constitution took a special interest in entrenching ESC rights in the 
country’s permanent constitution. However, it is important to note 
that South Africans did not list ESC rights separately from other 
fundamental rights. Instead, they considered ESC rights, together with 
civil and political rights “as human rights in the Bill of Rights” and 
hence, ESC rights “are interspersed between the other rights, on an 
equal level, emphasizing the interdependence and indivisibility of the 
different generations of rights.”295 Chapter 2 of the Constitution is 
devoted to the Bill of Rights, which the drafters considered as the 
“cornerstone of democracy” in the country and which “enshrines the 
rights of all the people in [the] country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”296 The Constitution 
imposed an obligation on the State of South Africa to “respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”297 This duty implies 
that the State must not only make certain that these rights are not 
violated by non-state actors but that the State itself and its agents (i.e., 
state actors), must not violate the rights guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights. 
Heyns and Brand have noted that a violation of the State’s duty 
to respect can involve a situation in which the State, for example, 
“without proper justification or procedure, demolishes the shacks of 
squatters, thereby removing their existing access to housing.”298 They 
go on to argue that the “duty to protect places a positive duty on the 
state to protect the bearers of these rights from unwarranted 
interference by private or non-state parties, or at least to provide an 
                                               
 295 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 157. 
 296 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 7(1). 
 297 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 7(2). 
 298 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245 at 158. Feinberg argues, for example, 
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effective remedy should that have happened.”299 They note that, with 
respect to South Africa, the right to protect, when “[a]pplied to the 
right to access to sufficient food for instance, this duty implies that the 
state is under an obligation to regulate the prices of foodstuffs, in order 
to ensure that they remain within the reach of ordinary people.”300 
With respect to the right to promote, the State has the 
obligation to educate the citizenry and make sure that they are fully 
aware of their rights while “[t]he obligation to fulfil refers to the positive 
obligation on the state to ensure the full realization of the rights in 
question.”301 When the duty to fulfil is applied to ESC rights, it means 
that “except to the extent that this is excluded through internal 
qualifiers (and of course the general limitations clause), the state must 
ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction ultimately receives the 
social goods in question.”302 
Section 8(2) is another general provision of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, which can potentially and significantly 
impact human rights in South Africa generally and socio-economic 
rights in particular. This section states as follows: “A provision of the 
                                               
 299 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. Emphasis in original. 
 300 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. 
 301 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. Emphasis in original. 
 302 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. See also Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, The Netherlands, Jan. 22–
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Maastricht Guidelines, id. at para. 6. 
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Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent 
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.”303 
According to § 8(2), ESC rights bind the State and create and 
regulate a vertical relationship between it and individuals within the 
State.304 The section also creates and regulates a horizontal relationship 
between private parties. It is important too that §§ 26(3) and 27(3) 
which deal with arbitrary evictions and the denial of emergency medical 
treatment respectively, clearly bind private persons/parties.305 The ESC 
rights and all the other rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the 
general limitation clause provided in § 36.306 
In ratifying the ICESCR, some countries made “qualifications” 
in respect of some of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. South 
Africa ratified the Covenant on January 12, 2015, and in doing so, it 
made a declaration under Article 13(2)(a), which read as follows: “The 
Government of the Republic of South Africa will give progressive 
effect to the right to education, as provided for in Article 13(2)(a) and 
Article 14, within the framework of its National Education Policy and 
                                               
 303 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 8(2). 
 304 If, for example, the state arbitrarily deprives a person of his property, that 
person can seek relief in the courts. Such action by the state violates § 25(1) of the 
Constitution (which is part of the Bill of Rights). That section states as follows: “No 
one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 25(1). 
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AFR., 1996, § 26(3). See also Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. 
 306 Section 36(1) states that: “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—(a) the 
nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature 
and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
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available resources.”307 In South Africa, civil society and various non-
governmental organizations (e.g., the Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute,308 the Legal Resources Center, Section 27,309 and the 
Community Law Center),310 many of whom had fought for ratification, 
criticized the government regarding its Article 13(2)(a) declaration. 
Section 27, the Legal Resources Center and several other NGOs 
declared as follows: “We are dismayed by the qualification made in 
respect of the right to education, which detracts from what is otherwise 
a moment to celebrate.”311 
The South African Constitution provides qualifications to ESC 
rights that are similar to those attached to the rights in the ICESCR. 
For example, § 27 of the South African Constitution guarantees rights 
to heath care, food, water and social security. Nevertheless, paragraph 
2 of § 27 imposes an internal qualification on the State’s obligation to 
realize these rights: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
                                               
 307 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 21, 2019: DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS, 
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each of these rights.”312 It is evident, then, that with respect to South 
Africa, one can recognize two types of ESC rights: “those with a fairly 
standard list of internal qualifications, and those without these 
qualifications.”313 The standard qualifications indicate that the 
government need only provide “access” to the “social good in 
question”314 and can do so, as made evident by § 27, “subject to 
available resources” and the State need only take “reasonable legislative 
and other measures” towards the “progressive realization” of these 
ESC rights.315 
The South African constitution speaks in terms of “rights to 
access,” as opposed to “direct access” to certain social goods. For 
example, § 26(1) states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing” and that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of this right.”316 Again, in § 27(1), it is stated 
that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to—(a) health care services, 
including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.”317 Heyns and 
Brand argue that: 
The formulation of some socio-economic rights in the 
South African Constitution as rights to “access” to 
certain social goods, rather than as direct rights to the 
social goods in question, does not reflect the 
formulation of socio-economic rights in the ICESCR 
or other international instruments, where rights are 
formulated as direct rights.318 
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They go on to note that this formulation, “give[s] expression 
to the interpretation attached to the rights on the international level as 
in the first instance rights to the creation of an enabling environment 
rather than rights to the provision of specific social goods.”319 Thus, 
“[t]he point of departure on the international level with regard to 
socio-economic rights is that of individuals who, given the right kind 
of enabling environment, are able to acquire the social goods implied 
by these rights for themselves.”320 The obligation imposed on the State 
with respect to these rights as defined in these international 
instruments is that each State should “create the right kind of 
environment within which self-sufficient individuals are able to acquire 
social goods for themselves” and that the State does not have to 
directly provide these socio-economic goods.321 
With respect to South Africa, consider, for example, the right 
to health care, food, water, and society security, enumerated in § 27 of the 
South African Constitution.322 The enumeration of these rights is 
prefaced by the phrase: “Everyone has the right to have access to,”323 which 
implies that the obligation imposed on the State of South Africa by the 
constitution is not for the government to directly provide those social 
goods and services (e.g., health care, food, water, and social security). 
Instead, the constitutional obligation is for the government to create 
an enabling environment within which each citizen can, on their own 
accord, acquire the socio-economic goods implied by these rights.324 
The South African Constitution states simply that “[e]veryone 
has the right to have access to,” for example, “adequate housing,” 
“health care services, including reproductive health care,” etc.325 It 
appears that under Section 27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution, 
which deals with the right to have access to “sufficient food and water,”326 
the South African state—at the national, provincial and local levels—
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is not legally required to provide citizens with food. However, the State 
is required to make certain that quality food at affordable prices is 
made available to all citizens. Nevondwe and Odeku argue, for 
example, that “the right to food is subject to the qualifier of 
progressive realization within the State’s available resources.”327 
Thus, the ESC rights guaranteed by South Africa’s Bill of 
Rights do not entitle citizens to socio-economic goods that are 
provided by the government at no cost to them. As made clear by § 
27, the Constitution only guarantees the “right to have access to,” for 
example, “sufficient food and water.”328 Nevertheless, in the case of a 
“natural disaster or famine, or other forms of destitution,” the State is 
then expected to “become responsible for the actual provision of 
food” and other socio-economic goods and services (e.g., health 
care).329 
The UN CESCR has made several general comments on the 
nature of States Parties’ obligations with regard to the ESC rights. In 
General Comment No. 3, the CESCR states that “while the [ICESCR] 
provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints 
due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various 
obligations which are of immediate effect.”330 According to the 
CESCR, in order to fully understand and appreciate the “precise 
nature” of the obligations of States Parties under the ICESCR,331 one 
must take cognizance of the following specific obligations found in 
Articles 2(1) & 2(2): First, is the “undertakes to take steps” obligation: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international 
                                               
 327 Lufuno Nevondwe and Kola O. Odeku, An Overview of the Constitutional 
Right to Food under the South African Constitution, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 761, 
761–762 (2014). 
 328 CONST. REP. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1)(b). 
 329 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159. 
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assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.332 
Second, is the “undertake to guarantee” that the rights 
enumerated in the ICESCR “will be exercised without discrimination” 
obligation: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present 
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.333 
With respect to these two obligations, the CESCR, in its 
General Comment No. 3, states that “while the full realization of the 
relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal 
must be taken within a reasonably short time after the [ICESCR’s] 
entry into force for the States concerned” and that “[s]uch steps should 
be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards 
meeting the obligations recognized in the [ICESCR].”334 Although, as 
indicated in Article 2(1), each State Party is required to undertake to 
take steps to achieve the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
ICESCR, the State Party is expected to do so “to the maximum of its 
available resources.”335 CESCR adds in its General Comment No. 3, 
however, that “even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate, the obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure 
the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the 
                                               
 332 See ICESCR, infra note 333, art. 2(1). Emphasis added. 
 333 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
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prevailing circumstances.”336 Thus, even if a State does not have 
enough resources to carry out all its necessary obligations, “the 
obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure the widest 
possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing 
circumstances.”337 In addition, argues the CESCR, “even in times of 
severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of 
adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable 
members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption 
of relatively low-cost targeted programs.”338 
The means which the State is expected to use to realize the 
qualified ESC rights contained in South Africa’s Bill of Rights—which 
are “reasonable legislative and other measures,”339 are “similar to those 
mentioned in article 2(1) of the ICESCR (‘all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’).”340 The 
CESCR argues, however, that “the adoption of legislative measures, as 
specifically foreseen by the [ICESCR], is by no means exhaustive of 
the obligations of States Parties.”341 The phrase “by all appropriate 
means,” argues the CESCR, “must be given its full and natural 
meaning.”342 States Parties to the ICESCR must, therefore, provide the 
CESCR with reports that “indicate not only the measures that have 
been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to be the 
most ‘appropriate’ under the circumstances.”343 
The CESCR also noted that “[a]mong the measures that might 
be considered appropriate, in addition to legislation, is the provision 
of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance 
with the national legal system, be considered justiciable.”344 For 
example, in South Africa, a country with a notorious and painful 
history of racial and other forms of discrimination, the provision of an 
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effective and independent judiciary system has been considered critical 
to the elimination of various forms of discrimination in the post-
apartheid society.345 Additional measures that are considered 
“appropriate” for the purpose of effecting the obligations imposed on 
States Parties by Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, include “administrative, 
financial, educational and social measures.”346 
Another “internal qualifier” placed on the South African State 
by the country’s Constitution as relates to the realization of the ESC 
rights is the requirement that “[t]he state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of this right.”347 This internal qualifier is 
analogous to that found in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR that States 
Parties must “take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized” in the ICESCR.348 
Due to resource scarcity, the realization of the ESC rights 
requires time, especially in countries, such as those in Africa, with 
extremely high rates of poverty. Many of these economies are unable 
to attract the type of investment expenditures that can create both 
wealth and jobs as well as generate the revenues that the government 
needs to realize the ESC rights. In addition, these countries face 
additional challenges from dysfunctional governing processes which 
endanger peace and security.349 The absence of peace and security in 
                                               
 345 See Pius Nkonzo Langa, The Protection of Human Rights by the Judiciary and 
Other Structures in South Africa, 52 SMU L. REV. 1531 (1999) (examining, inter alia, the 
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 347 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(2). 
 348 See ICESCR, supra note 333, art. 2(1). See also CESCR General Comment 
No. 3, supra note 330, para. 9 (noting, inter alia, that “[t]he concept of progressive 
realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic, 
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 349 In countries, such as Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, and South 
Sudan, the absence of effective and fully functioning governance systems has 
exacerbated violent conflict between subcultures and created an environment that is 
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these countries threatens the type of investment that could create the 
wealth needed to significantly improve the fulfilment of the ESC 
rights. Hence, “[b]ecause the full realization of socio-economic rights 
(including hospitals and universities, training doctors, et cetera) takes 
time, an obligation to realize the rights fully immediately would be 
unrealistic—the obligation is accordingly tempered to require only the 
full realization of the rights over time.”350 
This, however, is not a “blanket reprieve,”351 which may allow 
the State to take as long as it wishes to fulfil the obligations imposed 
on it by the ICESCR and, in the case of South Africa and other 
countries, their national constitutions. However, as the CESCR argues 
in its General Comment No. 3, while States Parties do have some level 
of flexibility when it comes to the realization of the ESC rights, each 
State Party, nevertheless, is required “to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards [the realization of the rights spelled out 
in the ICESCR].”352 As reflected in the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “[t]he fact that the 
full realization of most economic, social and cultural rights can only be 
achieved progressively, . . . does not alter the nature of the legal 
obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken 
immediately and others as soon as possible.”353 Thus, “the burden is 
on the State to demonstrate that it is making measurable progress 
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toward the full realization of the rights in question.”354 In addition, the 
State cannot “justify derogations or limitations of rights recognized in 
the [ICESCR] because of different social, religious and cultural 
backgrounds.”355 The Maastricht Principles also state that “resource 
scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in 
respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights.”356 
The CESCR also talks in terms of a “minimum core obligation 
[on the part of States Parties] to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the [ESC] rights.”357 As an 
example, the CESCR states that a State Party in which any significant 
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic 
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the [ICESCR].358 
1. The South African Constitution and Priority Rights 
Some scholars have distinguished between ESC rights that are 
not subject to internal constitutional qualifications, which they call 
“priority obligations” and those that are subject to internal 
constitutional qualifications or “internally qualified rights.”359 The 
South African Constitution creates priority rights through certain 
provisions. First, § 29(1)(a), which is part of the Bill of Rights, provides 
that “[e]veryone has the right—(a) to a basic education, including adult 
basic education.”360 Second, the Interim Constitution also made similar 
guarantees—§ 32(a) provides that “[e]very person shall have the 
right—(a) to basic education and to equal access to educational 
institutions.”361 In In re Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995, the 
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 361 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 200 of 
1993), https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-
africa-act-200-1993 (Nov. 1, 2019), art. 32(a). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
650 
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that § 32(a) of the Interim 
Constitution “creates a positive right that basic education be provided 
for every person and not merely a negative right that such a person 
should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her basic education.”362 In 
Motala and Another v. University of Natal, a case that was decided in 1995 
under the Interim Constitution and before the permanent constitution 
was adopted in 1996, the then Supreme Court held that the expression 
“basic education” as it is used in § 32(a) “does not include institutions 
of higher learning.”363 
Third, South Africa’s Bill of Rights also defines the rights of 
“[a]rrested, detained and accused persons.”364 Section 35(2)(e) provides 
that “[e]veryone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, 
has the right—(e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with 
human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state 
expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and 
medical treatment.”365 The interpretation of this section, in so far as it 
relates to “adequate medical treatment” was the subject of Van Biljon 
and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others.366 
In this case, a group of South African prisoners, who were HIV 
positive and had reached the symptomatic stage of the disease (i.e., 
AIDS), had claimed that they had a constitutionally-guaranteed right 
to be provided anti-viral medication at government expense as per § 
35(2)(e).367 The High Court (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) 
was called upon to decide two issues. The first issue was whether 
prisoners living with HIV who had reached the symptomatic stage of 
the disease were entitled to be prescribed antiretroviral treatment. The 
second issue was directly related to the first: if, indeed, these prisoners 
were entitled to be prescribed antiretroviral treatment, would such an 
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entitlement be at government expense? The “Court held that the first 
question was not within its purview to decide, as it was a purely medical 
assessment.”368 With respect to the second question, the Court “held 
that a lack of funds did not justify the Government’s failure to realize 
a prisoner’s right to adequate medical treatment.”369 The Court, 
however, noted that “the determination of what constitutes ‘adequate 
medical treatment’ could not be made in a vacuum and that financial 
constraints could be considered when making this decision.”370 
It has been noted that §§ 26(3) and 27(3) of the South African 
Constitution also “create priority obligations” on the part of the 
government.371 Section 26(3) deals with “housing” and provides as 
follows: 
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished, without an order of court made 
after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.372 
In Despatch Municipality v. Sunridge Estate and Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd.,373 the High Court was called upon to rule on the 
conflict between § 3(b) of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (Act 
No. 52 of 1951)374 and § 26(3) of the South African Constitution. 
Section 3(b) of the 1951 law authorized the demolition of unauthorized 
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“buildings or structures” without a court order. This was directly in 
conflict with § 26(3) of the Constitution of South Africa. The High 
Court held that § 3(b) was in conflict with § 26(3) and declared the 
former invalid.375 
The requirements of § 26 were also examined in Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg and City of 
Johannesburg and Others.376 In this case, 
[m]ore than 400 occupiers of two buildings in the inner 
city of Johannesburg (the occupiers) applied for leave 
to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. They challenged the correctness of the 
judgment and order of that Court authorizing their 
eviction at the instance of the City of Johannesburg 
(the City) based on the finding that the buildings they 
occupied were unsafe and unhealthy.377 
Yacoob J, writing for the Constitutional Court (“CC”), noted 
that § 26(3) of the Constitution “prohibits eviction of people from 
their home absent a court order that must be made after taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances. It means in effect that no 
person may be compelled to leave their home unless there exists an 
appropriate court order.”378 In addition, the learned justice added that 
“[i]t follows that any provision that compels people to leave their 
homes on pain of criminal sanction in the absence of a court order is 
contrary to the provisions of section 26(3) of the Constitution.”379 
Yacoob J also made reference to the CC’s decision in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v. Various Occupiers,380 where it was held that: 
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Section 26(3) evinces special constitutional regard for 
a person’s place of abode. It acknowledges that a home 
is more than just a shelter from the elements. It is a 
zone of personal intimacy and family security. Often it 
will be the only relatively secure space of privacy and 
tranquility in what (for poor people in particular) is a 
turbulent and hostile world. Forced removal is a shock 
for any family, the more so for one that established 
itself on a site that has become its familiar habitat.381 
Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution provides that 
“[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment.”382 The South 
African Constitutional Court was called upon to consider this 
constitutional provision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-
Natal).383 In this case, the appellant was a forty-one-year old, 
unemployed, diabetic man, who suffered “from ischaemic heart 
disease and cerebro-vascular disease which caused him to have a stroke 
during 1996.”384 After his kidneys failed, he subsequently applied for 
dialysis at state expense but his application was not successful. The CC 
turned down the application. Writing for the Constitutional Court, 
Chaskalson P held as follows: 
The applicant suffers from chronic renal failure. To be 
kept alive by dialysis he would require such treatment 
two to three times a week. This is not an emergency 
which calls for immediate remedial treatment. It is an 
ongoing state of affairs resulting from a deterioration 
of the applicant’s renal function which is incurable. In 
my view section 27(3) does not apply to these facts.385 
Chaskalson P then noted that § 27(3) only provides that 
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[a] person who suffers a sudden catastrophe which 
calls for immediate medical attention . . . should not be 
refused ambulance or other emergency services which 
are available and should not be turned away from a 
hospital which is able to provide the necessary 
treatment. What the section requires is that remedial 
treatment that is necessary and available be given 
immediately to avert that harm.386 
2. The South African Constitution and Internally Qualified Rights 
Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the South African Constitution create 
internally qualified rights. First, is § 26 which provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of this right.387 
Second, is § 27, which provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to— 
(a) health care services, including reproductive 
health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to 
support themselves and their dependents, 
appropriate assistance. 
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(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of each of these rights.388 
Note that § 27(1)(a) and § 27(2)389 were dealt with by the 
Constitutional Court in Soobramoney where the applicant made a claim 
for kidney dialysis treatment at state expense after invoking § 27(3). 
The Constitutional Court rejected his application, based on the right 
to “emergency medical treatment”390 and the “right to life.”391 
Nevertheless, Chaskalson P, writing for the CC, attempted to 
determine if the applicant’s application could succeed on the basis of 
§ 27(1)(a)’s “right to have access to—(a) health care services.”392 The 
Court noted that the right described in § 27(1)(a) is qualified by § 
27(2)—the State is only required by the Constitution to give effect to 
the right contained in § 27(1)(a) “within its available resources.”393 
Chaskalson P then noted that “[i]n the Court a quo Combrinck 
J had held that ‘[i]n this case the respondent has conclusively proved 
that there are no funds available to provide patients such as the 
applicant with the necessary treatment.’”394 The learned justice then 
went on to note that it was not only the Department of Health in 
KwaZulu-Natal that did not have enough funds to “cover the cost of 
services which are being provided to the public” but that this was “a 
nation-wide problem” as “resources [were] stretched in all renal clinics 
throughout the land.”395 Chaskalson P also noted that the respondent 
had developed guidelines that could be used to “assist the persons 
working in these clinics to make the agonizing choices which have to 
be made in deciding who should receive treatment, and who not. These 
guidelines were applied in the present case.”396 
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Stating that “[a] court will be slow to interfere with rational 
decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical 
authorities whose responsibility is to deal with such matters,”397 
Chaskalson P held that the applicant’s claim would still have failed 
even if “it had been brought on the basis of section 27(1)(a).”398 
Finally, is § 29(1)(b), which provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right—to further education, which the state, through reasonable 
measures, must make progressively available and accessible.”399 In 
Mahapa v. Minister of Higher Education and Another,400 the High Court of 
South Africa (Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg) was called upon 
to decide a case involving § 29(1)(b). The applicant, Desmond Mahapa, 
had applied for a bursary from the National Student Financial Aid 
Scheme (“NSFAS”) to finance his study of law at the University of 
South Africa (“UNISA”) but was not successful.401 
The applicant in Mahapa “contented that he [was] entitled to 
education at the tertiary level”402 by virtue of the right provided him by 
§ 29(1)(b) of the Constitution.403 The counsel for the Minister of 
Education (the first respondent) argued, however, that the first 
respondent had “no obligation to provide funds for the applicant to 
further his education” based on the strength of § 36(1) which provides 
that: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including— 
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(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.404 
As part of the analysis of the case, Mabesele J provided a brief 
review of the educational system of South Africa, with specific 
emphasis on access to education for African children during the 
apartheid era. The learned judge noted that since the end of apartheid, 
the “law and policies that governed and regulated [the] system of 
education [have] since been repealed” and that it would “not be 
necessary to refer to them, save to demonstrate their adverse impact 
on the education of the African child.”405 
Mabesele J noted that during the apartheid period in South 
Africa, “educational policies were carefully and deliberately formulated 
on the basis of discrimination, with the primary intention to prevent 
an African child, in particular, from thinking independently, debating 
issues constructively and becoming self-reliant.”406 The learned judge 
then referred to the Constitutional Court of South Africa case, Head of 
Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v. Hoërskool 
Ermelo and Another,407 and highlighted what Moseneke DCJ said about 
the impact of apartheid on education in South Africa. 
Writing for the CC in Head of Department, Moseneke DCJ 
reminded the country of the oppressive nature of the policy of 
apartheid on South Africa’s black population: 
                                               
 404 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 35(1)(a–e). 
 405 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 18. 
 406 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 19. 
 407 Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and 
Another v. Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC); 
2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (Oct. 14, 2009). 
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Apartheid has left us with many scars. The worst of 
these must be the vast discrepancy in access to public 
and private resources. The cardinal fault line of our 
past oppression ran along race, class and gender. It 
authorized a hierarchy of privilege and disadvantage. 
Unequal access to opportunity prevailed in every 
domain. Access to private or public education was no 
exception. While much remedial work has been done 
since the advent of constitutional democracy, sadly 
deep social disparities and resultant social inequity are 
still with us. 
It is so that white public schools were hugely better 
resourced than black schools. They were lavishly 
treated by the apartheid government. It is also true that 
they served and were shored up by relatively affluent 
white communities. On the other hand, formerly black 
public schools have been and by and large remain 
scantily resourced. They were deliberately funded 
stingily by the apartheid government. Also, they served 
in the main and were supported by relatively deprived 
black communities. That is why perhaps the most 
abiding and debilitating legacy of our past is an unequal 
distribution of skills and competencies acquired 
through education.408 
Mabesele J then noted that section 29(1) was designed to 
address these extreme inequalities in the distribution of educational 
opportunities.409 However, § 29(1) distinguishes between an immediately 
realizable right and one that is progressively realizable given available resources. 
The right to “basic education” is provided for in § 29(1)(a)—Mabesele 
J argues that this right is “immediately realizable.”410 This was made 
clear in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Others v. Essay 
                                               
 408 Head of Department, supra note 407, at paras. 45–46. 
 409 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 24. 
 410 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 25. 
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N. O. and Others,411 where Nkabinde J, writing for the Constitutional 
Court, held as follows: 
It is important, for the purpose of this judgment, to 
understand the nature of the right to “a basic 
education” under section 29(1)(a). Unlike some of the 
other socio-economic rights,
 
this right is immediately realizable. 
There is no internal limitation requiring that the right 
be “progressively realized” within “available 
resources” subject to “reasonable legislative 
measures.” The right to a basic education in section 
29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms of a law of general 
application which is “reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”
 
This right is therefore distinct 
from the right to “further education” provided for in 
section 29(1)(b). The state is, in terms of that right, 
obliged, through reasonable measures, to make further 
education “progressively available and accessible.”412 
Mabesele J noted that South African courts have, on several 
occasions, “ordered the state to comply with section 289(1)(a) in order 
to fulfil its constitutional obligation.”413 For example, in Tripartite 
Steering Committee and Another v. Minister of Basic Education and Others,414 
the High Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Division, 
Grahamstown) directed the Minster of Basic Education “to provide 
scholar transport . . . to the scholars”415 who lived very far away from 
their school and were unable to afford the cost of transportation. In 
the High Court’s view, the right to basic education would be 
                                               
 411 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Others v. Essay 
N. O. and Others, [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) (Apr. 11, 2010). 
 412 Governing Body, supra note 411, at para. 37. Emphasis added. Footnotes 
omitted. 
 413 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 26. 
 414 Tripartite Steering Committee and Another v. Minister of Basic 
Education and Others, [2015] ZAECGHC 67; 2015 (5) SA 107 (ECG); [2-15] 3 All 
SA 718 (ECG) (June 25, 2015). 
 415 Tripartite Steering Committee, supra note 414, para. 67. 
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meaningless if students could not get to school to receive that 
education. Specifically, the High Court declared that: 
The right to education is meaningless without teachers 
to teach, administrators to keep schools running, desks 
and other furniture to allow scholars to do their work, 
text books from which to learn and transport to and from 
school at State expense in appropriate cases.416 
In Section 27 & Others v. Minister of Education and Another, 
Kollapen J came to a similar conclusion as that reached in Tripartite 
Steering Committee. The learned judge declared that “the failure by the 
Limpopo Department of Education and the Department of Basic 
Education to provide text books to schools in Limpopo is a violation 
of a right to basic education.”417 The learned judge ordered the 
Limpopo Department of Education/Department of Basic Education 
“to provide text books for Grades R, 1, 2, 3 and 10 on an urgent 
basis.”418 
Kollapen J’s ruling in Section 27 & Others was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa by the Minister of Basic 
Education and other Limpopo officials.419 In dismissing the appeal, 
Navsa J (with Lewis, Cachalia, Petse and Dambuza JJA concurring) 
“declared that § 29(1)(a) of the Constitution entitles every learner at 
public schools in Limpopo to be provided with every textbook 
prescribed for his or her grade before commencement of the teaching 
of the course for which the textbook is prescribed.”420 The learned 
judge declared further that “it is the duty of the State, in terms of s 7(2) 
of the Constitution, to fulfil the s 29(1)(a) right of every learner by 
providing him or her with every textbook prescribed for his or her 
grade before commencement of the teaching of the course for which 
                                               
 416 Tripartite Steering Committee, supra note 414, para. 17, Plasket J citing 
to Kollapen J in Section 27 & Others v. Minister of Education and Another, [2012] 
ZAGPPHC 114; [2012] 3 All SA 579 (GNP); 2013 (2) BCLR 237 (GNP); 2013 (2) 
SA 40 (GNP) (May 17, 2012). 
 417 Section 27 & Others, supra note 416, at para. 20(2). 
 418 Section 27 & Others, supra note 416, at para. 20(3). 
 419 Minister of Basic Education v. Basic Education for All, [2015] ZASCA 
198; [2016] 1 All SA 369 (SCA); 2016 (4) SA 63 (SCA) (Dec. 2, 2015). 
 420 Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(1). 
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the textbook is prescribed.”421 Finally, Navsa J declared that “the 
National Department of Basic Education and the Limpopo 
Department of Education violated the s 29(1)(a), s 9 (equality) and s 
10 (dignity) rights of learners in Limpopo in 2014 by failing to provide 
all of them with every prescribed textbook before commencement of 
the teaching of the courses for which they were prescribed.”422 
While § 29(1)(a) deals with rights to basic education, § 29(1)(b) 
addresses the “right to further [tertiary] education.”423 The applicant in 
Mahapa relied on § 29(1)(b) to seek a bursary from the Minister of 
Higher Education to fund his study of the law.424 Mabesele J, writing 
for the High Court in Mahapa, noted that “[u]nlike section 29(1)(a), [§ 
29(1)(b)] . . . has internal limitation, requiring the state to be obliged, 
through reasonable measures, to make further education ‘progressively 
available and accessible.’”425 The learned judge went on to declare that 
“[r]egrettably, this right is distinct from [the] right to basic education, 
which is immediately realizable, and with no internal limitation 
requiring that it be ‘progressively realized’ within ‘available resources’ 
subject to ‘reasonable legislative measures.’”426 
Mabesele J also noted that § 29(1)(a) “is intended to eradicate 
illiteracy and promote literacy to enable everyone to understand the 
society in which they live and to fit well in that modern society.”427 On 
the other hand, § 29(1)(b) is designed to help individuals obtain the 
training, education, and the skills that they need to develop into 
productive and economically-viable adults.428 The learned judge then 
dismissed Desmond Mahapa’s application and declared that the 
Minister of Education did not owe any obligation to Mahapa, arising 
from section 29(1)(b), to protect the applicant’s right to further his 
education, by providing him with funds.”429 
                                               
 421 Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(2). 
 422 Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(3). 
 423 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, §§ 29(1)(a) and 29(1)(b). 
 424 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 30. 
 425 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 30. 
 426 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31. Emphasis in original. 
 427 Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31. 
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3. Other ESC Rights in South Africa’s Constitution 
There are other economic, social and cultural rights that are 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights but which “do not fit easily into the 
scheme of ‘priority’ rights and ‘internally qualified’ rights” examined 
earlier. Section 23 defines rights related to labor relations. According 
to § 23, 
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labor practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right— 
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and program of a 
trade union; and 
(c) to strike. 
(3) Every employer has the right— 
(a) to form and join an employers’ organization; 
and 
(b) to participate in the activities and programs of 
an employers’ organization. 
(4) Every trade union and every employers’ 
organization has the right— 
(a) to determine its own administration, programs 
and activities; 
(b) to organize; and 
(c) to form and join a federation. 
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organization and 
employer has the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to 
regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the 
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legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the 
limitation must comply with section 36(1). 
(6) National legislation may recognize union security 
arrangements contained in collective agreements. To 
the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this 
Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1). 
Under South Africa’s Constitution and as examined earlier, all 
these rights, the ESC rights, the priority rights, the internally qualified 
rights, and the labor rights, “are subject to the general limitations 
clause.”430 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERPRETATION AND 
ADJUDICATION OF CASES INVOLVING ESC RIGHTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA’S BILL OF RIGHTS 
A. Introduction 
Since the end of apartheid and the emergence of a non-racial, 
multiparty, democratic dispensation in the Republic of South Africa, 
whose foundation was the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, there has been intense debate about the justiciability of 
economic, social and cultural (“ESC”) rights. The designers of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid constitution specifically included ESC rights in 
the Bill of Rights.431 One important part of the debate on ESC rights 
centered around the “fact that the protection of such rights is 
dependent on the availability of resources.”432 Hence, some 
commentators have argued that “it is meaningless to provide for such 
rights without the resource capacity to ensure their protection.”433 
Arguments for and against inclusion of ESC rights in the Bill 
of Rights “were considered in the First Certificate Judgment in which 
                                               
 430 Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 163. 
 431 John Cantius Mubangizi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights 
in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 
(2006). 
 432 Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3. 
 433 Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3. 
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the Constitutional Court held that although socio-economic rights are 
not universally accepted as fundamental rights, they ‘are, at least to 
some extent justiciable; and at the very minimum can be negatively 
protected from invasion.’”434 As noted by the Constitutional Court in 
the case, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996,435 “[t]he formal purpose of [the judgment in this case] is to 
pronounce whether or not the Court certifies that all the provisions of 
South Africa’s proposed new constitution comply with certain 
principles contained in the country’s current constitution.”436 
Specifically, the Constitutional Court held, in Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, that: 
we are of the view that these rights are, at least to some 
extent, justiciable. As we have stated in the previous 
paragraph, many of the civil and political rights 
entrenched in the NT437 will give rise to similar 
budgetary implications without compromising their 
justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will 
almost inevitably give rise to such implications does 
not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.438 
                                               
 434 Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3. See also Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 
(CC) (Sept. 6, 1996). 
 435 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
supra note 434. 
 436 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
supra note 434, at para. 1. The reference to the “country’s current constitution” was 
to the Interim Constitution, officially known as Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (Act 200 of 1993). The principles mentioned are those contained in Schedule 4 
of the Interim Constitution and called “Constitutional Principles.” See Interim 
Constitution, Schedule 4. In order for the Constitutional Court to certify the final 
and permanent Constitution, § 71 of the Interim Constitution imposed the following 
conditions: “A new constitutional text shall—(a) comply with the Constitutional 
Principles contained in Schedule 4; and (b) be passed by the Constitutional Assembly 
in accordance with this Chapter.” See Interim Constitution, id. at § 71. 
 437 “NT” refers to New Text (that is, the 1996 Constitution) to distinguish it 
from the Interim Constitution, 1993. 
 438 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
supra note 434, at para. 78. One of the objections of the inclusion of the socio-
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Since South Africa adopted its permanent Constitution, the 
issue of the availability of resources “has been raised in all cases that 
have come before the Constitutional Court involving socio-economic 
rights.”439 It has been noted that although the Constitutional Court 
“initially stuttered in its decision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal, it was later to redeem itself in the subsequent decisions 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, Minister of Health 
and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, and Khosa v. Minister 
of Social Development.”440 Ngwena and Cook have argued that “what is 
missing from Soobramoney is a systematic approach to the determination 
of a socio-economic rights and a clear articulation of the normative 
content of the right to health care services.”441 In addition, they argued 
that: 
Soobramoney did not really lay down any guidelines that 
could be followed when interpreting socio-economic 
rights so as to illuminate and indigenize jurisprudence 
on socio-economic rights and also to guide lower 
courts with jurisdiction to determine constitutional 
matters. The Court did not consider how the right to 
health or the right of access to health care has been 
interpreted under international human rights 
instruments. In particular, the Court failed to make use 
of jurisprudence that has been developed by the 
Committee on [Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]. 
Thus, while the Court arrived at the correct conclusion, 
its approach fell short of a diligent consideration of 
relevant law.442 
                                               
economic rights in the country’s permanent constitution was “socio-economic rights 
are not justiciable, in particular because of the budgetary issues their enforcement 
may raise.” Id. at para. 78. 
 439 Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3. 
 440 Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3–4. Footnotes omitted. 
 441 Ngwena and Cook, infra note 442, at 127. 
 442 Charles Ngwena and Rebecca Cook, Rights Concerning Health, in SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 107, 137–138 (Danie Brand & Christof Heyns 
eds., 2005). 
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The Constitutional Court’s decisions in the last three cases 
listed above have been in line with the comments of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) on 
the obligations of States Parties under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). With respect to the 
ability of States Parties to attribute their failure to meet their minimum 
obligations under the ICESCR on a lack of available resources, the 
CESCR made the following declaration: 
In order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to 
a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that 
every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations.443 
The decisions of South Africa’s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court, in several cases, have effectively settled the 
debate on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the country. 
Yacoob J has noted that “[d]uring argument [in The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others],444 considerable 
weight was attached to the value of international law in interpreting 
section 26 of the Constitution.”445 Section 26 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, which is part of the country’s Bill of 
Rights, defines rights related to housing. This section states specifically 
that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. 
                                               
 443 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the ICESCR), para. 10. 
 444 The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. 
Grootboom and Others, [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) (Oct. 4, 2000). 
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(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have 
their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. 
No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.446 
Section 39 of the South African Constitution provides 
modalities for interpreting the Bill of Rights.447 This section imposes 
an obligation on South African courts to “consider international law 
as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of Rights.”448 Specifically, § 39 
provides as follows: 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of 
any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or 
conferred by common law, customary law or 
                                               
 446 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1–3). 
 447 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 39. 
 448 Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 26. 
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legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with 
the Bill.449 
In Makwanyane, a case that was decided under South Africa’s 
Interim Constitution,450 Chaskalson P, writing in the context of § 35(1) 
of that Constitution,451 declared as follows: 
[P]ublic international law would include non-binding 
as well as binding law. They may both be used under 
the section as tools of interpretation. International 
agreements and customary international law 
accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill 
of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for 
that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with 
comparable instruments, such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on 
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialized 
agencies such as the International Labor Organization, 
may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation 
of particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights].452 
In the section that follows, we shall examine two South African 
cases to see how the country’s courts have utilized international law as 
a tool of interpretation in deciding cases involving the economic, social 
                                               
 449 CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 39(1–3). Emphasis added. 
 450 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 1993, 
https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-
act-200-1993 (Nov. 4, 2019). 
 451 Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution states as follows: “In 
interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law.” Id. at § 35(1). Emphasis added. 
 452 S v. Makwanyane and Another, [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 
1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (June 6, 1995), para. 35. 
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and cultural rights contained in the Bill of Rights. These cases were 
chosen because it was the Constitutional Court’s rulings in them that 
settled the debate on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the 
Republic of South Africa and established the legal foundation for the 
protection of ESC rights in the country. A recent report by the South 
African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development noted 
that although the government has been providing “free housing to the 
poor” for a while, “the Grootboom judgment” (Grootboom is one of the 
cases examined), however, “made it mandatory for the State to put in 
place mechanisms that would speed up this process and provide shelter 
in emergency situations. [Grootboom] led to the introduction of a new 
Housing Code that sought to respond to the [Constitutional Court’s] 
judgment and order.”453 Grootboom, as well as the other case examined 
below—Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others—can be considered foundational cases in the development of 
South Africa’s jurisprudence on the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. 
B. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. 
Grootboom and Others (Constitutional Court of South Africa) 
In Grootboom and Others,454 Mrs. Irene Grootboom and several 
other respondents455 had been evicted from their “informal homes 
                                               
 453 N. Bohler-Muler, et al, Assessment of the Impact of Decisions of the Constitutional 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal on the Transformation of Society: Final Report 
(Commissioned by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development), 
Nov. 2015, 
http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/1768/8835_Final%2
0report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Dec. 13, 2019), at 88. See also John Cantius 
Mubangizi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African 
Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2006). The report 
produced by Bohler-Muller and his colleagues at the Human Sciences Research 
Council (“HSRC”) and the Nelson Mandela School of Law of the University of Fort 
Hare noted that the “Grootboom case had a marked impact on the development of 
South African constitutional jurisprudence, particularly on the enforcement of socio-
economic rights” and that it also “had a major impact on housing policy in South 
Africa.” Bohler-Muller, id. at 89. 
 454 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444. 
 455 The respondents consisted of 510 children and 390 adults. Mrs. 
Grootboom, who was the first respondent, had brought an application before the 
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situated on private land earmarked for formal low-cost housing”456 and 
hence, rendered homeless. After they were evicted, the respondents 
made an application to the Cape of Good Hope High Court “for an 
order requiring government to provide them with adequate basic 
shelter or housing until they obtained permanent accommodation and 
were granted certain relief.”457 The High Court ordered the appellants 
“to provide the respondents who were children and their parents with 
shelter. The judgment provisionally concluded that ‘tents, portable 
latrines and a regular supply of water (albeit transported) would 
constitute the bare minimum.’”458 Subsequently, “[t]he appellants who 
represent all spheres of government responsible for housing 
challenge[d] the correctness of that order.”459 
During the court hearing on the matter, the appellants made 
an offer “to ameliorate the immediate crisis situation in which the 
respondents were living. The offer was accepted by the 
respondents.”460 Nevertheless, four months after the offer was made 
and accepted, the appellants had not yet complied with the terms of 
the offer and the respondents “made an urgent application to [the 
Constitutional Court]” and the CC, “after communication with the 
parties, crafted an order putting the municipality on terms to provide 
certain rudimentary services.”461 
Yacoob J, writing for the Constitutional Court, began his 
analysis with an overview of the history of housing discrimination 
under apartheid and how the latter’s policies affected African people’s 
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access to housing.462 One consequence of apartheid housing and influx 
control policies was that they forced many people into “rudimentary 
informal settlements providing for minimal shelter, but little else.”463 The 
learned justice then went on to describe the horrible conditions which 
Mrs. Grootboom and the other respondents, who lived in an informal 
settlement called Wallacedene, were subjected to.464 
Although Mrs. Grootboom and the others had applied to the 
municipal government for “subsidized low-cost housing,”465 none was 
forthcoming even after seven years of waiting. So, many of them 
moved out of Wallacedene at the end of September 1998 and 
subsequently “put up their shacks and shelters on vacant land that was 
privately owned and had been earmarked for low-cost housing. They 
called the land ‘New Rust.’”466 In December 1998, the owner of the 
land on which Mrs. Grootboom and the others had settled “obtained 
an ejectment order against them in the magistrates’ court” and after 
negotiations, an order of eviction was granted “requiring the occupants 
to vacate New Rust and authorizing the sheriff to evict them and to 
dismantle and remove any of their structures remaining on the land on 
19 May 1999.”467 
Yacoob J noted that “although the validity of the eviction order 
[had] never been challenged,” to determine its validity under “the 
provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from the Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998,” it had to be “accepted as 
correct.”468 The learned justice then stated that the respondents “were 
forcibly evicted at the municipality’s expense” and that “[t]his was 
done prematurely and inhumanely: reminiscent of apartheid-style 
evictions. The respondents’ homes were bulldozed and burnt and their 
possessions destroyed. Many of the residents who were not there could 
not even salvage their personal belongings.”469 The respondents 
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 468 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 10 
 469 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 10. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
672 
subsequently sought shelter at the Wallacedene sports field. Shortly 
thereafter, their attorney “wrote to the municipality [and described] the 
intolerable conditions under which his clients were living and 
demanded that the municipality meet its constitutional obligations and 
provide temporary accommodation to the respondents.”470 
Not satisfied with the municipality’s response, the respondents 
“launched an urgent application in the High Court on 31 May 1999” 
and the High Court subsequently “granted relief to the respondents 
and the appellants [appealed] against that relief.”471 Yacoob J then 
proceeded to outline the “reasoning adopted in the High Court 
judgment.”472 The learned justice noted that Mrs. Grootboom and the 
other respondents based their claim on § 26 of the Constitution, which 
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing”473 and imposes an obligation on the State “to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of this right.”474 The respondents also 
invoked § 28(1)(c) of the Constitution to support their claim.475 
Yacoob J noted that the High Court judgment consisted of two 
separate parts. First, the High Court considered the respondent’s claim 
under § 26 of the Constitution and concluded that: 
In short [appellants] are faced with a massive shortage 
in available housing and an extremely constrained 
budget. Furthermore in terms of the pressing demands 
and scarce resources [appellants] had implemented a 
housing program in an attempt to maximize available 
resources to redress the housing shortage. For this 
reason it could not be said that [appellants] had not 
taken reasonable legislative and other measures within 
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its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realization of the right to have access to adequate 
housing.476 
The High Court then rejected the “argument that the right of 
access to adequate housing under section 26 included a minimum core 
entitlement to shelter in terms of which the state was obliged to 
provide some form of shelter pending implementation of the program 
to provide adequate housing.”477 Yacoob J then noted that the second 
part of the High Court’s judgment “addressed the claim of the children 
for shelter in terms of section 28(1)(c).”478 The learned justice went on 
to note that the High Court “reasoned that the parents bore the 
primary obligation to provide shelter for their children, but that section 
28(1)(c) imposed an obligation on the state to provide that shelter if 
parents could not” and that the “shelter to be provided according to 
this obligation was a significantly more rudimentary form of protection 
from the elements than is provided by a house and falls short of 
adequate housing.”479 
The High Court then concluded that “an order which enforces 
a child’s right to shelter should take account of the need of the child 
to be accompanied by his or her parent. Such an approach would be 
in accordance with the spirit and purport of section 28 as a whole.”480 
Yacoob J then reviewed the High Court’s order—the Court had 
ordered as follows: 
(2) It is declared, in terms of section 28 of the 
Constitution that; 
(a) the applicant children are entitled to be 
provided with shelter by the appropriate organ or 
department of state; 
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(b) the applicant parents are entitled to be 
accommodated with their children in the 
aforegoing shelter; and 
(c) the appropriate organ or department of state is 
obliged to provide the applicant children, and their 
accompanying parents, with such shelter until such 
time as the parents are able to shelter their own 
children.481 
Yacoob J then proceeded to outline the argument in the 
Constitutional Court (“CC”). The learned justice noted that the 
“[w]ritten argument submitted on behalf of the appellants and the 
respondents concentrated on the meaning and import of the shelter 
component and the obligations imposed upon the state by section 
28(1)(c).”482 Yacoob J also noted that 
[t]he written argument filed on behalf of the amici 
sought to broaden the issues by contending that all the 
respondents, including those of the adult respondents 
without children, were entitled to shelter by reason of 
the minimum core obligation incurred by the state in 
terms of section 26 of the Constitution. It was further 
contended on behalf of the amici that the children’s 
right to shelter had been included in section 28(1)(c) to 
place the right of children to this minimum core 
beyond doubt.483 
Yacoob J then noted that the “key constitutional provisions at 
issue in [the case at bar] are section 26 and section 28(1)(c).”484 The 
learned justice then noted that “[w]hile the justiciability of socio-
economic rights has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential 
and political debate, the issue of whether socio-economic rights are 
justiciable at all in South Africa has been put beyond question by the 
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text of our Constitution as construed in the Certification judgment.”485 
Yacoob J noted that during the certification proceedings,486 it had been 
“contended that [socio-economic rights] were not justiciable and 
should therefore not have been included in the text of the new 
Constitution.”487 In response, the CC held as follows: 
[T]hese rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable. 
As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of 
the civil and political rights entrenched in the NT will 
give rise to similar budgetary implications without 
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-
economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such 
implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their 
justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic 
rights can be negatively protected from improper 
invasion.488 
Noting that in South Africa, socio-economic rights are 
“expressly included in the Bill of Rights,” Yacoob J argued that the 
issue is not one of whether these rights are justiciable under the 
country’s basic law (i.e., its Constitution), “but how to enforce them in 
a given case.”489 The learned justice then noted that “[a]lthough the 
judgment of the High Court in favor of the appellants was based on 
the right to shelter (section 29(1)(c) of the Constitution), it is 
appropriate to consider the provisions of section 26 first so as to 
facilitate a contextual evaluation of section 29(1)(c).”490 Yacoob J then 
proceeded to examine the obligations imposed on the state by § 26 and 
discussed how to interpret this provision.491 Of particular note to 
Grootboom and Others is that rights must “be interpreted and understood 
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in their social and historical context.”492 The right not to be 
discriminated against, noted Yacoob J, “must be understood against 
[South Africa’s] legacy of deep social inequality.”493 
Yacoob J then cited to Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu-Natal),494 where Chaskalson P described the context in which 
the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted. In that case Chaskalson P held 
as follows: 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities 
in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable 
conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of 
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many 
do not have access to clean water or to adequate health 
services. These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to 
address them, and to transform our society into one in 
which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional 
order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist 
that aspiration will have a hollow ring.495 
Once the issue of the context in which the Bill of Rights was 
to be interpreted had been examined, the CC then moved on to 
consider the role of international law in the interpretation of the 
Constitution and noted that § 39 of the Constitution “obliges a court 
to consider international law as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights.”496 Yacoob J then cited to Chaskalson P’s decision in 
Makwanyane,497 where Chaskalson P held that “[i]nternational 
agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a 
framework within which Chapter Three can be evaluated and 
                                               
 492 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 25. 
 493 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 25 
 494 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), [1997] ZACC 17; 
1998 C1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) (BCLR) 1696 (Nov. 27, 1997). 
 495 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), supra note 494, 
para. 8. 
 496 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 26. 
 497 S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123. 
2020 The Role of International Human Rights Law 8:2 
677 
understood.”498 The learned Chief Justice and President of the CC 
noted that “[t]he relevant international law can be a guide to 
interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle 
or rule of international law will vary,” however, “where the relevant 
principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly 
applicable.”499 
Yacoob J then noted that “[t]he amici submitted that the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
Covenant) is of significance in understanding the positive obligations 
created by the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.”500 Yacoob J 
made reference to Article 11.1 of the Covenant, which provides as 
follows: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of 
this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free 
consent.501 
This case, The Government of The Republic of South Africa, was 
decided by the CC on October 4, 2000. At this time, South Africa had 
signed but had not yet ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The country finally 
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ratified the ICESCR on January 12, 2015.502 Article 11(1), Yacoob J 
argued, must be read with Article 2(1), which provides that: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.503 
The learned justice then proceeded to examine the “differences 
between the relevant provisions of the Covenant and [South Africa’s] 
Constitution” and noted that these differences are “significant in 
determining the extent to which the provisions of the Covenant may 
be a guide to an interpretation of section 26.”504 The differences, “in 
so far as they relate to housing,” Yacoob J noted, are: 
(a) The Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing 
while section 26 provides for a right of access to adequate 
housing. 
(b) The Covenant obliges states parties to take 
appropriate steps which must include legislation while the 
Constitution obliges the South African state to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures.505 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“CESCR”) is tasked with the job of monitoring the actions 
undertaken by States Parties to ensure compliance with the ICESCR. 
Yacoob J noted that the amici in this case had relied on “the relevant 
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general comments issued by the [CESCR] concerning the 
interpretation and application of the [ICESCR], and argued that these 
general comments constitute a significant guide to the interpretation 
of section 26.”506 The amici noted that in interpreting § 26 of the 
Constitution, the court should pay particular attention to paragraph 10 
of the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3, which states as follows: 
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the 
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, 
over a period of more than a decade of examining 
States parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that 
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each 
of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, 
for example, a State party in which any significant 
number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic 
shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were 
to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived 
of its raison d’e ̂tre. By the same token, it must be noted 
that any assessment as to whether a State has 
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take 
account of resource constraints applying within the 
country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State 
party to take the necessary steps “to the maximum of 
its available resources”. In order for a State party to be 
able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum 
core obligations to a lack of available resources it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to 
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satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.507 
Yacoob J then noted that “[i]t is clear from [the extract above] 
that the [CESCR] considers that every [State Party] is bound to fulfil a 
minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum 
essential level of the socio-economic rights, including the right to 
adequate housing.”508 Thus, argued the learned justice, “a state in 
which a significant number of individuals is deprived of basic shelter 
and housing is regarded as prima facie in breach of its obligations under 
the Covenant.”509 Each State Party, hence, must “demonstrate that 
every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal to 
satisfy the minimum core of the right.”510 The CESCR’s General 
Comment, however, does not define what it means by “minimum 
core.”511 
Noting that the “[m]inimum core obligation is determined 
generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group 
that is entitled to the protection of the right in question,” Yacoob J 
then concluded that “[i]t is in this context that the concept of minimum 
core obligation must be understood in international law.”512 With 
respect to the determination of a minimum core in the context of “the 
right to have access to adequate housing,”513 Yacoob J noted that the 
Court “did not have sufficient information to determine what would 
comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of [the South 
African] Constitution.”514 It was not necessary, the learned justice 
stated, for the Court to “decide whether it is appropriate for a court to 
determine in the first instance the minimum core content of a right.”515 
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Yacoob J then proceeded to “consider the meaning and scope 
of section 26 in its context.”516 The learned justice began the analysis 
by noting that subsections (1) and (2) of § 26 “are related and must be 
read together,”517 and that the right “delineated in section 26(1) is a 
right of ‘access to adequate housing’ as distinct from the right to 
adequate housing encapsulated in the Covenant.”518 This, the learned 
justice noted, is an important difference. In order for an individual to 
fully exercise the right of access to adequate housing, Yacoob J noted, 
land must be available, “appropriate services such as the provision of 
water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all these, 
including the building of the house itself.”519 
Thus, argued the learned justice, in order for a person “to have 
access to adequate housing, . . . there must be land, there must be 
services, there must be a dwelling” and hence, 
[a] right of access to adequate housing also suggests 
that it is not only the state who is responsible for the 
provision of houses, but that other agents within our 
society, including individuals themselves, must be 
enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing. The state must create the conditions for 
access to adequate housing for people at all economic 
levels of our society. State policy dealing with housing 
must therefore take account of different economic 
levels in our society.”520 
Within South African society, for those individuals who are 
financially able to purchase houses, argued Yacoob J, the “state’s 
primary obligation lies in unlocking the system, providing access to 
housing stock and a legislative framework to facilitate self-built houses 
through planning laws and access to finance.”521 However, with respect 
to the poor, that is, those who cannot afford or have the financial 
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resources to purchase houses, the state needs to pay special attention 
to them.522 The learned justice went on to state that “[i]t is in this 
context that the relationship between sections 26 and 27 and the other 
socio-economic rights is most apparent.”523 While § 26(2) “speaks to 
the positive obligation imposed upon the state,”524 it makes clear that 
“the obligation imposed upon the state is not an absolute or 
unqualified one.”525 Three important or key elements define or qualify 
the state’s obligation: “(a) the obligation to ‘take reasonable legislative 
and other measures’; (b) ‘to achieve the progressive realization’ of the 
right; and (c) ‘within available resources.’”526 
Yacoob J makes note of the fact that South Africa’s is a federal 
governmental system, consisting of federal/national, provincial and 
local government spheres. As a consequence, “[a] reasonable 
[legislative] program” designed “to achieve the progressive realization” 
of an ESC right “must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the 
different spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate 
financial and human resources are available.”527 Hence, the learned 
justice continued, “a co-ordinated state housing program must be a 
comprehensive one determined by all three spheres of government in 
consultation with each other as contemplated by Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution.”528 While each sphere of government “must accept 
responsibility for the implementation of particular parts of the 
program,” Yacoob J argues, however, that the national government 
“must assume responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, programs 
and strategies are adequate to meet the state’s section 26 
obligations.”529 
Since the state is required by law “to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures” to meet the “positive obligations imposed on it 
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by section 26(2),” argues Yacoob J, “the question will be whether the 
legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable.”530 In 
addition to legislative measures, noted Yacoob J, the state must also 
design and implement “well-directed policies,” which themselves must 
be implemented reasonably.531 The learned justice then goes on to 
argue that in order to determine if a program designed to realize the 
state’s obligations under § 26(2) is reasonable, it is necessary “to 
consider housing problems [in South Africa] in their social, economic 
and historical context,” as well as “the capacity of institutions 
responsible for implementing the program.”532 In addition, argues the 
learned justice, “[a] program that excludes a significant segment of 
society cannot be said to be reasonable” and most importantly, 
“[r]easonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole. The right of access to adequate housing is 
entrenched because we value human beings and want to ensure that 
they are afforded their basic human needs.”533 
Yacoob J argues that the obligation imposed on the state by § 
26(2) involves the “progressive realization” of the right spelled out in 
§ 26(1)—that is, “the right to have access to adequate housing.”534 Read 
together, the two sections indicate that the “right could not be realized 
immediately.”535 The phrase “progressive realization,” states Yacoob J, 
“is taken from international law and Article 2.1 of the [International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] in particular.”536 
                                               
 530 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, paras. 41 and 42. Emphasis in 
original. 
 531 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 342 
 532 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 43. 
 533 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 44. 
 534 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45. See also CONST. S. AFR., 
1996, §§ 26(1) & 26(2). 
 535 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45. 
 536 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45. Article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states as follows: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” See International 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
684 
Yacoob J then goes on to argue that the CESCR has analyzed the 
requirement of progressive realization of ESC rights and made the 
following comment: 
Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in 
other words progressively, is foreseen under the 
Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving 
the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the 
one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the 
realities of the real world and the difficulties involved 
for any country in ensuring full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. On the other 
hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the raison d’e ̂tre, of the Covenant 
which is to establish clear obligations for States parties 
in respect of the full realization of the rights in 
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that 
goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive 
measures in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by 
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in 
the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources.537 
CESCR General Comment No. 3 was designed to explain and 
elaborate States Parties’ obligations under the ICESCR. Nevertheless, 
argues Yacoob J, the CESCR’s analysis 
is also helpful in plumbing the meaning of ‘progressive 
realization’ in the context of [the South African] 
Constitution. The meaning ascribed to the phrase is in 
harmony with the context in which the phrase is used 
in [the South African] Constitution and there is no 
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reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in 
the Constitution as in the document from which it was 
so clearly derived.538 
Yacoob J then next examines the phrase “within its available 
resources”539 and concludes that the obligation on the South African 
state contained in § 26(2) of the Constitution of South Africa “does 
not require the state to do more than its available resources permit.”540 
This implies, argues Yacoob J, that “both the content of the obligation 
in relation to the rate at which it is achieved as well as the 
reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result are 
governed by the availability of resources.”541 This reasoning is in line 
with the Constitutional Court’s decision in Soobramoney,542 where 
Chaskalson P said that: 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the 
obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 
in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water 
and social security are dependent upon the resources 
available for such purposes, and that the 
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason 
of the lack of resources. Given this lack of resources 
and the significant demands on them that have already 
been referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet 
these needs would not presently be capable of being 
fulfilled.543 
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the realization of 
“the right to have access to adequate housing” points to “a balance 
between goal and means.”544 As argued by Yacoob J, “[t]he measures 
must be calculated to attain the goal expeditiously and effectively but 
the availability of resources is an important factor in determining what 
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is reasonable.”545 The learned justice then went on to examine the 
“fragmented housing arrangements”546 that the state inherited from the 
apartheid regime in 1994, as well as the system as it existed at the time 
that Grootboom and Others was decided, including the roles played by 
each of the three governmental spheres.547 
Yacoob J then made reference to the definition of “housing 
development” and “housing development project” as provided in § 1 
of the Housing Act.548 The Housing Act sets out, in § 2(1) “the general 
principles binding on national, provincial and local spheres of 
government.”549 In addition, the Housing Act also “sets out the 
functions of the national, provincial and local government in relation 
to housing.”550 Part of the task before the Constitutional Court in this 
case was “to decide whether the nationwide housing program is 
sufficiently flexible to respond to those in desperate need in our society 
and to cater appropriately for immediate and short-term 
requirements.”551 
Yacoob J then returned to § 28(1)(c) of the Constitution and 
noted that the High Court’s judgment amounted to: 
(a) section 28(1)(c) obliges the state to provide 
rudimentary shelter to children and their parents on 
demand if parents are unable to shelter their children; 
(b) this obligation exists independently of and in 
addition to the obligation to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures in terms of section 26; and (c) the 
state is bound to provide this rudimentary shelter 
irrespective of the availability of resources. On this 
                                               
 545 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 46. 
 546 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 47. This case was decided 
by the Constitutional Court on Oct. 4, 2000. 
 547 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, paras. 47–50. 
 548 Government of South Africa, NO. 107 OF 1997: HOUSING ACT, 1997, 
https://www.gov.za/documents/housing-act (Nov. 6, 2019), § 1(vi–vii). 
 549 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 49. See also HOUSING ACT, 
1997, § 2(1). 
 550 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 50. The functions of the 
three governmental spheres are set out in §§ 3, 7 & 9. 
 551 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 55. 
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reasoning, parents with their children have two distinct 
rights: the right of access to adequate housing in terms 
of section 26 as well as a right to claim shelter on 
demand in terms of section 28(1)(c).552 
The learned justice then noted that “[t]his reasoning produces 
an anomalous result. People who have children have a direct and 
enforceable right to housing under section 29(1)(c), while others who 
have none or whose children are adult are not entitled to housing under 
that section, no matter how old, disabled or otherwise deserving they 
may be.”553 
Most importantly, argues Yacoob J, 
[t]he carefully constructed constitutional scheme for 
progressive realization of socio-economic rights would 
make little sense if it could be trumped in every case by 
the rights of children to get shelter from the state on 
demand. Moreover, there is an obvious danger. 
Children could become stepping stones to housing 
their parents instead of being valued for who they 
are.554 
Noting that there is “an evident overlap between the rights 
created by sections 26 and 27 and those conferred on children by 
section 28,” Yacoob J argues, however, that “[t]his overlap is not 
consistent with the notion that section 28(1)(c) creates separate and 
independent rights for children and their parents.”555 
Yacoob J returns to international law and states that “[t]he 
extent of the state obligation must also be interpreted in the light of 
the international obligations binding upon South Africa.”556 The 
learned justice considered the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
                                               
 552 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 70. 
 553 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 71. 
 554 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 71. 
 555 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 74. 
 556 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 75. 
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Child (“CRC”), which was ratified by South Africa in 1995.557 The CRC 
imposes an obligation on States Parties to make certain that the rights 
of children within their countries are respected and properly protected. 
According to Article 2(1), 
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set 
forth in the present Convention to each child within 
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, 
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal 
guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status.558 
According to Yacoob J, § 28 of the South African Constitution 
“is one of the mechanisms to meet these obligations” which are 
binding on the state.559 This section obligates the state “to take steps 
to ensure that children’s rights are observed” and the state does so 
by ensuring that there are legal obligations to compel 
parents to fulfil their responsibilities in relation to their 
children. Hence, legislation and the common law 
impose obligations upon parents to care for their 
children. The state reinforces the observance of these 
obligations by the use of the civil and criminal law as 
well as social welfare programs.560 
Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa, argues 
Yacoob J, “must be read in this context.”561 According to subsections 
28(1)(b) and (c): 
Every child has the right— 
                                               
 557 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20, 1999). 
 558 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 557, art. 2(1). 
 559 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 75. 
 560 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 75. 
 561 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 76. 
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(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when removed from the family 
environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services 
and social services.562 
Yacoob J states that these two subsections: 
must be read together. They ensure that children are 
properly cared for by their parents or families, and that 
they receive appropriate alternative care in the absence 
of parental or family care. The section encapsulates the 
conception of the scope of care that children should 
receive in our society. Subsection (1)(b) defines those 
responsible for giving care while subsection (1)(c) lists 
various aspects of the care entitlement.563 
The state, for example, must provide needed shelter to children 
who have been removed from their parents.564 Hence, argues Yacoob 
J, § 28(1)(c) “does not create any primary state obligation to provide 
shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being 
cared for by their parents or families.”565 
Despite this conclusion, Yacoob J argues that “[t]his does not 
mean, however, that the state incurs no obligation in relation to 
children who are being cared for by their parents or families.”566 First, 
“the state must provide the legal and administrative infrastructure 
necessary to ensure that children are accorded the protection 
contemplated by section 28.”567 Second, “the state is required to fulfil 
its obligations to provide families with access to land in terms of 
section 25, access to adequate housing in terms of section 26 as well as 
                                               
 562 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 28(1)(c). 
 563 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 76. 
 564 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 77. 
 565 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 77. 
 566 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 78. 
 567 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 78. 
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access to health care, food, water and social security in terms of section 
27.”568 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment was that “sections 25 and 
27 require the state to provide access on a programmatic and 
coordinated basis, subject to available resources. One of the ways in 
which the state would meet section 27 obligations would be through a 
social welfare program providing maintenance grants and other 
material assistance to families in need in defined circumstances.”569 
Nevertheless, noted Yacoob J, “[i]t was not contended that the 
children who are respondents in this case should be provided with 
shelter apart from their parents.”570 The learned justice then went on 
to state that “[a]ll levels of government must ensure that the housing 
program is reasonably and appropriately implemented in the light of 
all the provisions in the Constitution.”571 In addition, “[a]ll 
implementation mechanisms, and all state action in relation to housing 
falls to be assessed against the requirements of section 26 of the 
Constitution. Every step at every level of government must be 
consistent with the constitutional obligation to take reasonable 
measures to provide adequate housing.”572 
However, noted Yacoob J, § 26 must be “read in the context 
of the Bill of Rights as a whole”573 and the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of state action must consider the “inherent dignity of 
human beings.”574 The learned justice then proceeded to allow the 
appeal in part, set aside the order of the Cape of Good Hope High 
Court and replace it with another, which included the following: 
                                               
 568 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 78. Section 25 defines, inter 
alia, the rights to property and the conditions under which one may be deprived of 
his or her property. Section 26 defines the right to have access to adequate housing, 
and section 27 defines the right to have access to health care, food, water and social 
security. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, §§ 25, 26 & 27. 
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 570 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 79. 
 571 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 82. 
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It is declared that: 
(a)  Section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the 
state to devise and implement within its available 
resources a comprehensive and coordinated program 
progressively to realize the right of access to adequate 
housing. 
(b)  The program must include reasonable 
measures such as, but not necessarily limited to, those 
contemplated in the Accelerated Managed Land 
Settlement Program, to provide relief for people who 
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and 
who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis 
situations. 
(c)  As at the date of the launch of this application, 
the state housing program in the area of the Cape 
Metropolitan Council fell short of compliance with the 
requirements in paragraph (b), in that it failed to make 
reasonable provision within its available resources for 
people in the Cape Metropolitan area with no access to 
land, no roof over their heads, and who were living in 
intolerable conditions or crisis situations.575  
In reaching its decision in this case involving economic, social 
and cultural rights (specifically, the right to have access to adequate 
housing), the Constitutional Court utilized international law as a tool 
of interpretation. First, Yacoob J cited to Soobramoney, a case decided 
by the Constitution Court in 1997. In this case, Chaskalson P described 
the context in which the Bill of Rights must be interpreted and made 
note of what he believed lay at the heart of the country’s new 
constitutional order—human dignity, freedom, and equality.576 Then 
Yacoob J cited to another one of Chaskalson P’s decisions, that in 
Makwanyane, where the Chief Justice and President of the 
Constitutional Court, held that “[i]nternational agreements and 
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customary international law accordingly provide a framework within 
which Chapter Three can be evaluated and understood.”577 
Yacoob J then discussed differences between relevant 
provisions of the ICESCR and the South African Constitution and 
showed how provisions of the ICESCR could be used as a guide to the 
interpretation of § 26 of the Constitution, especially as they relate to 
the right to have access to adequate housing. Yacoob J also made 
generous use of the general comments of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, especially as they relate to the 
obligations of each State Party to ensure the realization of the ESC 
rights. After noting that the “[m]inimum core obligation [of each State 
Party] is determined generally by having regard to the needs of the 
most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the right in 
question,” Yacoob J then concluded that “[i]t is in this context that the 
concept of minimum core obligation must be understood in 
international law.”578 
Yacoob J made specific use of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (“CESCR”) General Comment 
No. 3 to help interpret expressions, such as, “progressive realization” 
and “within its available resources” in South Africa’s Bill of Rights. 
After using the general comments of the CESCR to interpret various 
terms and expressions in § 26, Yacoob J noted that “[t]he extent of the 
state obligation must also be interpreted in the light of the international 
obligations binding upon South Africa.”579 Yacoob J also made 
reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) 
and noted that the CRC, which was ratified by South Africa in 1995, 
imposes an obligation on South Africa to ensure that children’s rights 
within the country are respected and properly and fully protected.580 
Thus, in making their decision in Grootboom and Others, the 
                                               
 577 Makwanyane, supra note 123, para. 35. Note that Makwanyane was decided 
in 1995 and hence, was decided under the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). 
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Constitutional Court made use of international law as an interpretive 
tool. 
C. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (Constitutional Court of South Africa) 
This case was an appeal to the Constitutional Court (“CC”) in 
which the appellants were praying for a reversal of “orders made in a 
high court against government because of perceived shortcomings in 
its response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS challenge.”581 More 
specifically, the High Court’s finding was that the “government had 
acted unreasonably in (a) refusing to make an antiretrovial drug called 
nevirapine available in the public health sector where the attending 
doctor considered it medically indicated and (b) not setting out a 
timeframe for a national program to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV.”582 
The original applicants in this case were several associations 
and members of civil society who were concerned with the treatment 
of HIV/AIDS and with the prevention of new infections. Of these, 
the principal actor was the Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”).583 
As part of its response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the Government 
of South Africa designed a program to specifically address “mother-
to-child transmission of HIV at birth and identified nevirapine as its 
drug of choice for this purpose.”584 The government’s program, 
however, imposed “restrictions on the availability of nevirapine in the 
public health sector.”585 In the High Court case, the applicants 
“contended that these restrictions are unreasonable when measured 
                                               
 581 Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (No. 2), [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (July 5, 
2002), para. 2. The appellants were the South African Minister of Health and 
Members of the Executive Council for Health of the Eastern Cape, Free State, 
Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, and 
the North West. 
 582 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 2. 
 583 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 3. In 
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 584 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 4. 
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against the Constitution, which commands the state and all its organs 
to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”586 
At issue in this case are the rights guaranteed by §§ 27(1) and 
28(1) of the Constitution, which are part of the Bill of Rights. 
According to § 27(1–2), “[e]veryone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; (2) The 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of 
these rights.”587 Section 28(1) provides as follows: “Every child has the 
right—(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services.”588 
The second issue in this case also arose out of the provisions 
of §§ 27 & 28 and concerns whether the “government is 
constitutionally obliged and had to be ordered forthwith to plan and 
implement an effective, comprehensive and progressive program for 
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout 
the country.”589 
As part of the background to the appeal, the Constitutional 
Court (“CC”) noted that the “two principal issues” before the CC “had 
been in contention between the applicants and the government for 
some considerable time prior to the launching of the application before 
the High Court.”590 In September 1999, when applicant, Treatment 
Action Campaign (“TAC”), “pressed for acceleration of the 
government program for the prevention of intrapartum mother-to-
                                               
 586 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 4. The 
duty in question is provided for in §§ 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution. According to 
§ 7(2), “[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.” Section 8(1) provides as follows: “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.” See CONST. 
REP. S. AFRICA, §§ 7(2) & 8(1). 
 587 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 27(1–2). 
 588 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 28(1). 
 589 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 5. 
 590 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. The 
applicants included the Treatment Action Campaign, Dr. Haroon Saloojee, 
Children’s Rights Center, Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Community 
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child transmission of HIV,” TAC and the other concerned parties were 
“told by the Minister that this could not be done because there were 
concerns about, among other things, the safety and efficacy of 
nevirapine.”591 
In August 2000, nearly a year after the Minister of Health’s 
proclamation about “safety and efficacy of nevirapine,”592 and 
“following the [thirteenth] International AIDS Conference in Durban 
[South Africa] [as well as] a follow-up meeting attended by the Minister 
and the MECs, the Minister announced that nevirapine would still not 
be made generally available. Instead, each province was going to select 
two sites for further research and the use of the drug would be 
confined to such sites.”593 In a letter dated July 17, 2001 and written by 
their attorney, the applicants: 
placed on record that “[t]he Government has decided 
to make NVP [nevirapine] available only at a limited 
number of pilot sites, which number two per 
province.” 
The result is that doctors in the public sector, who do 
not work at one of those pilot sites, are unable to 
prescribe this drug for their patients, even though it has 
been offered to the government for free.594 
The applicants then asked the Minister to: 
(a) provide us with legally valid reasons why you will 
not make NVP available to patients in the public health 
sector, except at the designated pilot sites, or 
alternatively to undertake forthwith to make NVP 
available in the public health sector. 
                                               
 591 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. 
 592 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. 
 593 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. The 
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(b) undertake to put in place a program which will 
enable all medical practitioners in the public sector to 
decide whether to prescribe NVP for their pregnant 
patients, and to prescribe it where in their professional 
opinion this is medically indicated.595 
In a reply dated August 6, 2001, the Minister of Health “did 
not deny the restrictions imposed on the government on the 
availability of nevirapine” and indicated that there was no specific plan 
to extend the availability of nevirapine.596 The CC noted that the 
“meaning of the Minister’s letter is, however, quite unmistakable. It 
details a series of governmental concerns regarding the safety and 
efficacy of nevirapine requiring continuation of government’s research 
program.”597 
The CC noted that, 
in January 2001 the World Health Organization [had] 
recommended the administration of [nevirapine] to 
mother and infant at the time of birth in order to 
combat HIV and between November 2000 and April 
2001[,] the Medicines Control Council settled the 
wording of the package insert dealing with such use. 
The insert was formally approved by the Council in 
April 2001 and the parties treated that as the date of 
approval of the drug for the prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.598 
The Minister, the CC noted further, “quite clearly intimated 
that . . . [t]he decision was to confine the provision of nevirapine in the 
public sector to the research sites and their outlets.”599 
The CC noted, however, that “[t]he crux of the problem [was]: 
what is to happen to those mothers and their babies who cannot afford 
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access to private health care and do not have access to the research 
and training sites?”600 At the time the appeal came before the CC, there 
was no clear indication on when the government would make the 
medicine—nevirapine—available outside the research and training 
sites.601 The CC went on to note that it was quite clear from the 
materials presented to the Court by the government that nevirapine 
was not likely to be made available at “any public health institution 
other than one designated as part of a research site.”602 
The two principal issues before the Constitutional Court were, 
as stated in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the affidavit of the TAC: 
20. The first issue is whether the Respondents are 
entitled to refuse to make Nevirapine (a registered 
drug) available to pregnant women who have HIV and 
who give birth in the public health sector, in order to 
prevent or reduce the risk of transmission of HIV to 
their infants, where in the judgment of the attending 
medical practitioner this is medically indicated. 
21. The second issue is whether the Respondents are 
obliged, as a matter of law, to implement and set out 
clear timeframes for a national program to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, including 
voluntary counselling and testing, antiretroviral 
therapy, and the option of using formula milk for 
feeding.603 
The CC then moved on to provide an overview of the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa. The Court 
                                               
 600 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17. 
 601 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17. 
 602 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17. 
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noted that it had had to “consider claims for enforcement of socio-
economic rights on two occasions” and that “[o]n both occasions it 
was recognized that the state is under a constitutional duty to comply 
with the positive obligations imposed on it by sections 26 and 27 of 
the Constitution.”604 The Court, noted, however, that “the obligations 
are subject to the qualifications expressed in sections 26(2) and 
27(2).”605 With respect to the first opportunity that the CC had to rule 
on a claim for the enforcement of socio-economic rights, in 
Soobramoney “the claim was dismissed because the applicant failed to 
establish that the state was in breach of its obligations under section 
26 in so far as the provision of renal analysis to chronically ill patients 
was concerned.”606 
In Grootboom,607 the CC had a second opportunity to rule on a 
claim for the socio-economic rights. In that case, the Court upheld the 
claim “because the state’s housing policy in the area of the Cape 
Metropolitan Council failed to make reasonable provision within 
available resources for people in that area who had no access to land 
and no roof over their heads and were living in intolerable 
conditions.”608 
With respect to Treatment Action Campaign and Others, the Court 
noted that the question before it was not “whether socio-economic 
rights are justiciable,” but “whether the applicants have shown that the 
measures adopted by the government to provide access to health care 
services for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies fall short 
of its obligations under the Constitution.”609 Before proceeding to 
examine the applicants’ legal submissions, the Court considered “a line 
of argument presented on behalf of the first and second amici,” which 
“contended that section 27(1) of the Constitution establishes an 
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individual right vested in everyone.”610 It was further contended that the right 
mentioned above has “a minimum core to which every person in need 
is entitled.”611 
The Court then noted that “the concept of ‘minimum core’ 
was developed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights [“CESCR”] which is charged with monitoring the 
obligations undertaken by [State Parties] to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”612 For example, the CESCR, 
in its General Comment No. 3, which deals with the nature of States 
Parties’ obligations, states that: 
[o]n the basis of the extensive experience gained by the 
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, 
over a period of more than a decade of examining 
States Parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that 
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each 
of the rights is incumbent upon every State Party.613 
According to the Court, “[s]upport for this contention was 
sought in the language of the Constitution and attention was drawn to 
the differences between sections 9(2), 24(b), 25(5) and 25(8) on the 
one hand, and sections 26 and 27 on the other.”614 After examining the 
differences between the two sets of constitutional provisions, the 
Court stated that, although the minimum core in these provisions may 
be difficult to define, it, nevertheless, “includes at least the minimum 
decencies of life consistent with human dignity.”615 In addition, argued 
the Court, “[n]o one should be condemned to a life below the basic 
level of dignified human existence. The very notion of individual rights 
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presupposes that anyone in that position should be able to obtain relief 
from a court.”616 
The main issue in this case comes down to how South African 
courts have interpreted “subsections (1) and (2) of both section 26 and 
27” and how these subsections are “linked in the text of the 
Constitution.”617 The Court noted that the issue of interpretation has 
been resolved by the Court in Soobramoney618 and Grootboom.619 In 
Soobramoney, Chaskalson P declared as follows: 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the 
obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 
in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water 
and social security are dependent upon the resources 
available for such purposes, and that the corresponding 
rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources.620 
The Court in the present case—Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others—then noted that the obligations referred to in the above 
paragraph from Soobramoney, “are clearly the obligations referred to in 
sections 26(2) and 27(2) and the corresponding rights referred to in 
sections 26(1) and 27(1).”621 In Grootboom, the Court made clear that §§ 
26(1) and 26(2) “are closely related and must be read together.”622 
Yacoob J, writing for the Court in Grootboom, said: 
The section has been carefully crafted. It contains three 
subsections. The first confers a general right of access 
to adequate housing. The second establishes and 
delimits the scope of the positive obligation imposed 
upon the state to promote access to adequate housing 
and has three key elements.623 
                                               
 616 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 28. 
 617 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 29. 
 618 Soobramoney, supra note 494. 
 619 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444. 
 620 Soobramoney, supra note 494, at para. 11. 
 621 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 31. 
 622 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 34. 
 623 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 21. 
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The Grootboom Court also declared that “[s]ection 26 does not 
expect more of the State than is achievable within its available 
resources.”624 In addition, § 26 does not confer on any individual an 
entitlement to “claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.”625 
“[A]s far as the rights of access to housing, health care, sufficient food 
and water, and social security for those unable to support themselves 
and their dependents are concerned,”626 the South African “State is not 
obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these rights 
immediately.”627 
In Grootboom, Yacoob J also made use of provisions of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) and held that in terms of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, the question that the Court needed to address was 
“whether the measures taken by the State to realize the right afforded 
by [section] 26 are reasonable.”628 The Court in the present case—
Treatment Action Campaign and Others—then noted that: 
[a]lthough Yacoob J indicated that evidence in a 
particular case may show that there is a minimum core 
of a particular service that should be taken into account 
in determining whether measures adopted by the state 
are reasonable, the socio-economic rights of the 
Constitution should not be construed as entitling 
everyone to demand that the minimum core be 
provided to them. Minimum core was thus treated as 
possibly being relevant to reasonableness under section 
26(2), and not as a self-standing right conferred on 
everyone under section 26(1).629 
The Treatment Action Campaign and Others Court then went on to 
state that “[i]t is impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ 
service immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected 
                                               
 624 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 46. 
 625 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 95. 
 626 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 32. 
 627 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 94. 
 628 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 33. 
 629 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 34. 
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of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-
economic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive 
basis.”630 The Court then concluded that: 
 . . . section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise 
to a self-standing and independent positive right 
enforceable irrespective of the considerations 
mentioned in section 27(2). Sections 27(1) and 27(2) 
must be read together as defining the scope of the 
positive rights that everyone has and the 
corresponding obligations on the state to “respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil” such rights. The rights 
conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) are to have 
“access” to the services that the state is obliged to 
provide in terms of sections 26(2) and 27(2).631 
Next, the Court provided an overview of government policy 
on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.632 In doing 
so, the Court noted that after the Thirteenth International Conference 
on HIV/AIDS that was held in Durban (South Africa) in July 2000, 
the government “took a decision to implement a program for the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS.”633 This 
new program, the Court noted, “entailed the provision of voluntary 
HIV counseling and testing to pregnant women, the provision of 
nevirapine and the offer of formula feed to HIV-positive mothers who 
chose this option of feeding.”634 Nevertheless, the implementation of 
this program was “to be confined to selected sites in each province for 
a period of two years” and used “primarily to evaluate the use of 
nevirapine, monitoring and evaluating its impact on the health status 
of the children affected as well as the feasibility of such an intervention 
on a countrywide basis.”635 It was stipulated that information gathered 
from these clinical trials would be used to develop a “national policy 
                                               
 630 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 35. 
 631 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 39. 
 632 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at paras. 40–43. 
 633 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41. 
 634 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41. 
 635 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41. 
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for the extension of this program to other public facilities outside the 
pilot sites.”636 
The Court then proceeded to review the applicants’ case, 
which centered on their belief that: 
the measures adopted by the government to provide 
access to health care services to HIV-positive pregnant 
women were deficient in two material respects: first, 
because they prohibited the administration of 
nevirapine at public hospitals and clinics outside the 
research and training sites; and second, because they 
failed to implement a comprehensive program for the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.637 
In examining the applicants’ case, the Court noted that “[i]n 
deciding on the policy to confine nevirapine to the research and 
training sites, the cost of the drug itself was not a factor.”638 This, the 
Court argued, was made clear in an affidavit presented to the Court by 
Dr. Ntsaluba. According to Dr. Ntsaluba: 
I admit that the medicine has been offered to the first 
to ninth respondents for free for a period of five years 
by the manufacturer. The driving cost for the provision 
of Nevirapine however is not the price to be attached 
to the medicine but the provision of the formula 
feeding for those persons who are not in a position to 
afford formula feeds in order to discourage breast 
feeding and other costs incurred to provide operational 
structures which are appropriately and properly geared 
toward counselling and testing persons who are 
candidates for the administration of Nevirapine.639 
                                               
 636 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41. 
 637 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 44. 
 638 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48. 
 639 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48. 
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In addition, Dr. Ntsaluba also stated that: 
[t]he public health sector hospitals, as it is, are under 
tremendous pressure, and while it may be ideal for such 
doctors to go on to provide Nevirapine with the 
appropriate advice, counselling and follow-up care, is 
presently not immediately attainable. It is imperative 
that appropriate support structures for counselling, 
follow-up etc. be put in place to ensure that Nevirapine 
is effective and that it delivers the promised benefits.640 
With respect to the government’s program on the provision of 
health care services to HIV-positive mothers, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he costs that are of concern to the government are therefore the 
costs of providing the infrastructure for counseling and testing, of 
providing formula feed, vitamins and an antibiotic drug and of 
monitoring, during bottle-feeding, the mothers and children who have 
received nevirapine.”641 
Nevertheless, stated the Court, “[t]hese costs are relevant to 
the comprehensive program to be established at the research and 
training sites. They are not, however, relevant to the provision of a 
single dose of nevirapine to both mother and child at the time of 
birth.”642 The Court noted that the government had given four reasons 
for restricting the “administration of nevirapine to the research and 
training sites.”643 First, the government complained about the “efficacy 
of nevirapine where the ‘comprehensive package’ is not available.”644 
Second, “there was a concern that the administration of nevirapine to 
the mother and her child might lead to the development of resistance 
to the efficacy of nevirapine and related antiretrovirals in later years.”645 
Third, nevirapine is considered “a potent drug and it is not known 
                                               
 640 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48. 
 641 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 49. 
 642 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 50. 
 643 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51. 
 644 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51. 
 645 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51. 
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what hazards may attach to its use.”646 Finally, there was the issue of 
resource scarcity. The Court noted that: 
[i]t was contended on behalf of government that 
nevirapine should be administered only with the ‘full 
package’ and that it was not reasonably possible to do 
this on a comprehensive basis because of the lack of 
trained counsellors and counselling facilities and also 
budgetary constraints which precluded such a 
comprehensive scheme being implemented.647 
The Court then proceeded to examine the issues raised by the 
government regarding the use of nevirapine. After examining the issue 
of nevirapine’s efficacy, the Court held that “the wealth of scientific 
material produced by both sides makes plain that sero-conversion of 
HIV takes place in some, but not all, cases and that nevirapine thus 
remains to some extent efficacious in combating mother-to-child 
transmission even if the mother breastfeeds her baby.”648 With respect 
to resistance, the Court noted that “[a]lthough resistant strains of HIV 
might exist after a single dose of nevirapine, this situation is likely to 
be transient.”649 
Regarding the safety of nevirapine, the Court noted 
that 
[t]he only evidence of potential harm concerns risks 
attaching to the administration of nevirapine as a 
chronic medication on an ongoing basis for the 
treatment of HIV-positive persons. There is, however, 
no evidence to suggest that a dose of nevirapine to 
both mother and child at the time of birth will result in 
any harm to either of them.650 
                                               
 646 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51. 
 647 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 54. 
 648 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 58. 
 649 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 59. 
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The Court then noted that the World Health Organization has 
recommended the use of nevirapine, without qualification, for the 
treatment of HIV-positive persons651 and the South African Medicines 
Control Council “registered nevirapine in 1998 (affirming its quality, 
safety and efficacy) and later expressly approved its administration to 
mother and infant at the time of birth in order to combat HIV.”652 
With respect to capacity, the Court noted that: 
[a]lthough the concerns raised by Dr. Simelela are 
relevant to the ability of government to make a ‘full 
package’ available throughout the public health sector, 
they are not relevant to the question whether 
nevirapine should be used to reduce mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at those public hospitals and 
clinics outside the research sites where facilities in fact 
exist for testing and counselling.653 
The Court then noted that: 
[t]he policy of confining nevirapine to research and 
training sites fails to address the needs of mothers and 
their newborn children who do not have access to the 
sites. It fails to distinguish between the evaluation of 
programs for reducing mother-to-child transmission 
and the need to provide access to health care services 
required by those who do not have access to the 
sites.654 
Next, the Court made reference to its decision in Grootboom 
regarding what it means for government policy or action to be 
reasonable. There, the Court held as follows: 
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of 
account the degree and extent of the denial of the right 
                                               
 651 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 60. 
 652 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 61. 
 653 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 66. 
 654 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 67. 
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they endeavor to realize. Those whose needs are the 
most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights 
therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realization of the right.655 
The Court acknowledged that the research carried out at the 
government-designated research and training sites can inform public 
policy and enhance the ability of the government to develop and 
implement more effective programs to deal with mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV-AIDS. Nevertheless, the Court also noted that: 
[t]his does not mean, however, that until the best 
program has been formulated and the necessary funds 
and infrastructure provided for the implementation of 
that program, nevirapine must be withheld from 
mothers and children who do not have access to the 
research and training sites. Nor can it reasonably be 
withheld until medical research has been completed.656 
The Court concluded by making reference to Yacoob J’s 
decision in Grootboom, where the learned justice stated that a program 
to realize socio-economic rights must “be balanced and flexible and 
make appropriate provision for attention to . . . crises and to short, 
medium, and long-term needs. A program that excludes a significant 
segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable.”657 
The Court also noted that in deciding this case, it was also 
important to consider the rights of children, specifically, new-born 
children. According to § 28(1)(b) and (c) of the South African 
Constitution, 
[e]very child has the right— 
(a) . . . 
                                               
 655 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 68. 
 656 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 68. 
 657 Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 43. 
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(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services 
and social services.658 
The Court then noted that the applicants, as well as, the amici 
curiae, “relied on these [constitutional] provisions to support the order 
made by the High Court.”659 The Court then proceeded to cite to 
Yacoob J’s holding in Grootboom, where the learned justice held that 
subsections (b) and (c) of § 28 (1) “must be read together.”660 Yacoob 
J then went on to note that § 28(1)(b) and § 28(1)(c): 
ensure that children are properly cared for by their 
parents or families, and that they receive appropriate 
alternative care in the absence of parental or family 
care. The section encapsulates the conception of the 
scope of care that children should receive in our 
society. Subsection (1)(b) defines those responsible for 
giving care while subsection (1)(c) lists various aspects 
of the care entitlement. 
It follows from subsection 1(b) that the Constitution 
contemplates that a child has the right to parental or 
family care in the first place, and the right to alternative 
appropriate care only where that is lacking.661 
Relying on these passages from the Grootboom judgment, the 
counsel for the government had argued before the Court that § 28(1)(c) 
imposes “an obligation on the parents of the newborn child, and not 
the state, to provide the child with the required basic health care 
services.”662 The Court noted, however, that while the primary 
responsibility for providing basic health care services to children “rests 
on those parents who can afford to pay for such services, it was made 
                                               
 658 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 28(1)(b) & (c). 
 659 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 74. 
 660 Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 75. 
 661 Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 75. 
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clear in Grootboom that ‘[t]his does not mean . . . that the State incurs 
no obligation in relation to children who are being cared for by their 
parents or families.’”663 
The Court then examined the jurisprudence of foreign 
jurisdictions, notably, the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, the House of 
Lords (UK), and the Supreme Court of India, on the question of 
remedies and noted that “courts in other countries also accept that it 
may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case, to issue injunctive relief against the state.”664 
The Court then set aside the orders made by the High Court 
and replaced them with others, which included the following: 
We accordingly make the following orders: 
1. The orders made by the High Court are set aside and 
the following orders are substituted. 
2. It is declared that: 
a) Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require 
the government to devise and implement within its 
available resources a comprehensive and 
coordinated program to realize progressively the 
rights of pregnant women and their newborn 
children to have access to health services to 
combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
b) The program to be realized progressively within 
available resources must include reasonable 
measures for counselling and testing pregnant 
women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive 
pregnant women on the options open to them to 
reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
                                               
 663 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 77. See 
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HIV, and making appropriate treatment available 
to them for such purposes. 
c) The policy for reducing the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV as formulated and 
implemented by government fell short of 
compliance with the requirements in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that: 
i) Doctors at public hospitals and clinics other than 
the research and training sites were not enabled to 
prescribe nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV even where it was 
medically indicated and adequate facilities existed 
for the testing and counselling of the pregnant 
women concerned. 
ii) The policy failed to make provision for 
counsellors at hospitals and clinics other than at 
research and training sites to be trained in 
counselling for the use of nevirapine as a means of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV. 
3. Government is ordered without delay to: 
a) Remove the restrictions that prevent nevirapine 
from being made available for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not 
research and training sites. 
b) Permit and facilitate the use of nevirapine for 
the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV and to make it available for 
this purpose at hospitals and clinics when in the 
judgment of the attending medical practitioner 
acting in consultation with the medical 
superintendent of the facility concerned this is 
medically indicated, which shall if necessary 
2020 The Role of International Human Rights Law 8:2 
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include that the mother concerned has been 
appropriately tested and counselled. 
c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors 
based at public hospitals and clinics other than the 
research and training sites to be trained for the 
counselling necessary for the use of nevirapine to 
reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV. 
d) Take reasonable measures to extend the testing 
and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics 
throughout the public health sector to facilitate and 
expedite the use of nevirapine for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV. 
4. The orders made in paragraph 3 do not preclude 
government from adapting its policy in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution if equally appropriate 
or better methods become available to it for the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
5. The government must pay the applicants’ costs, 
including the costs of two counsel. 
6. The application by government to adduce further 
evidence is refused.665 
As was the case with its decision in Grootboom, the 
Constitutional Court utilized international law as a tool of 
interpretation. Specifically, the Court made reference to Soobramoney 
and Grootboom, cases in which the Constitutional Court had used 
international law to interpret various sections of the Constitution 
dealing with socio-economic rights, particularly §§ 26 and 27. The 
Court made specific reference to the General Comments of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), 
which is empowered and charged with “monitoring the obligations 
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undertaken by States Parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”666 The Court looked 
specifically to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3 in its efforts to 
deal with the issue of “minimum core.”667 Hence, in making their 
judgment in Treatment Action Campaign and Others, the justices of the 
Constitutional Court made use of international law as an interpretive 
tool. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, the international environment for the 
recognition and protection of human rights has improved significantly. 
The international community has adopted several treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which impose obligations on each State Party to undertake: 
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in [the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights], without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.668 
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 667 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General 
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In addition, international organizations,669 regional 
organizations,670 and national governments671 have adopted various 
“procedures for protecting against and providing remedies for human 
rights abuses.”672 
Human rights are considered “a domain of international 
law.”673 Since treaties674 and custom are the most important sources of 
international law, any study of international human rights must 
invariably involve an examination and understanding of treaties and 
their relationship to each country’s domestic laws.675 By far, one of the 
most important treaties of the modern era is the United Nations 
Charter, which established the United Nations.676 Since 1945, the 
international community has concluded, adopted, and ratified other 
treaties, particularly those dealing with human rights.677 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, together with the International 
                                               
 669 For example, the United Nations, which has adopted such international 
human rights instruments as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
 670 For example, the Organization of African Unity/African Union, which 
has adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
 671 For example, since the early-1990s, many African countries have adopted 
new constitutions or amended their existing constitutions to include a Bill of 
Rights—the latter includes constitutional recognition of and protections for human 
rights. See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (No. 108 of 
1996)—G17678, at Chapter 2. 
 672 DAVID WEISSBRODT AND CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2007). 
 673 WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4. 
 674 See WEISSBRODT, supra note 672, at 4. 
 675 WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4. 
 676 See Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (Oct. 24, 1945). 
 677 In addition to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the international 
community has also adopted and ratified other international human rights 
instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are collectively referred to as 
the International Bill of Human Rights.678 
Unfortunately, the international community does not have a 
government that has the capacity to enforce international human 
rights, that is, those guaranteed by the various international human 
rights instruments.679 International legal scholars have argued that 
national governments, that is the governments of States Parties to each 
international human rights instrument, can function as an effective 
mechanism for enforcing international human rights law. David 
Weissbrodt states that “[t]he most effective mechanism for enforcing 
international law is for each ratifying government to incorporate its 
treaties and customary obligations into national laws.”680 
For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, 
provides that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form 
part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.”681 Earlier, this article 
examined the two approaches to the determination of how effect is 
given to international law instruments in each country. These are the 
monist and dualist approaches.682 In countries, which follow the 
monist approach, international law and domestic law comprise one 
single legal order within the country’s legal system, but international 
law overrides any contrary domestic law.683 In a monist country, once 
an international treaty has been signed and ratified, it is no longer 
necessary for national legislators to domesticate the treaty and create 
rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.684 
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In countries that follow the dualist approach, the legislature 
must domesticate provisions of international law in order to create 
rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. In dualist countries, 
international law and domestic law are considered separate and 
independent legal systems and for international law to create rights that 
are justiciable in domestic courts, national authorities must explicitly 
use legislation to incorporate the provisions of international law 
instruments into domestic law.685 It is important to note that 
international jurists and other international law experts consider 
international norms “that have attained the status of international 
customary law . . . to be part of municipal law under both the monist 
and dualist theories, and therefore prevail over national law even in 
domestic courts.”686 
This article noted that “[a] State can, through its constitution, 
put to rest any doubts as to whether international law, including 
customary international law, is law within its jurisdiction.”687 South 
Africa’s post-apartheid constitution, for example, directly addresses 
the applicability of both international law and customary international 
law in the country’s domestic courts.688 Throughout the continent, 
however, some countries have been able to overcome the constraints 
that “nonincorporation [of treaties] would normally impose through 
their use of international human rights instruments as persuasive 
authority in national court decisions.”689 
Courts in some African countries, such as Ghana, which has 
not explicitly made allowance in its constitution for the use of 
international law as some form of authority, have overcome the 
constraints imposed on them by adopting the “transjudicial model.”690 
As explained by Adjami, “[t]he transjudicial model accounts for the 
actual use of international law and comparative case law in domestic 
courts, regardless of the binding or nonbinding status of their 
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sources.”691 International law scholars have argued that 
transjudicialism has significantly improved dialogue across the world’s 
judicial system, as well as judicial comity.692 This article then examined 
cases from several countries to determine the extent to which domestic 
courts have utilized international law and comparative law sources in 
their decisions generally and interpretation of national constitutions in 
particular. Specifically, the present article examined cases from Ghana, 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania. Through this 
process, it was determined that courts in many African countries are 
increasingly utilizing international law and comparative law as 
instruments to help them interpret their national constitutions, 
including their Bills of Rights. As declared by Archer CJ in New Patriotic 
Party v. Inspector-General of Police (Ghana), “I do not think that the fact 
that Ghana has not passed specific legislation to give effect to [the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights], [means that] the 
Charter cannot be relied upon.”693 
This article further makes reference to case law from South 
Africa to demonstrate how judges have been able to find creative ways 
to use international human rights instruments to interpret the Bill of 
Rights and significantly enhance the recognition and protection of 
human rights. In this section, emphasis is placed on economic, social 
and cultural rights, which are contained in both the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and South Africa’s 
Bill of Rights.694 First, the present article provided a general overview 
of economic, social and cultural (“ESC”) rights in the context of South 
African political economy, as well as the country’s 1993695 and 1996696 
constitutions. Second, the article distinguished between ESC rights 
that are not subject to internal constitutional qualifications, or priority 
                                               
 691 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112–113. 
 692 Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. 
 693 Quoted in Christian N. Okeke, The Use of International Law in the Domestic 
Courts of Ghana and Nigeria, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 411–412 (2015). 
 694 South Africa’s Bill of Rights are found in Chapter 2 of the country’s post-
apartheid Constitution. 
 695 The 1993 Constitution is generally referred to as the Interim Constitution 
or the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 2000 of 1993. 
 696 The 1996 Constitution is South Africa’s permanent post-apartheid 
Constitution or Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996. 
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rights, and those that are subject to internal qualifications, which are 
referred to as internally qualified rights. In doing so, this article identified 
those constitutional provisions that contain priority rights and those 
that contain internally qualified rights. Third, this article examined 
various South African cases to see how the courts interpret various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights dealing with ESC rights. For example, 
Van Biljon and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others697 
provided an interpretation for § 35(2)(e) of the Constitution as it relates 
to the expression “adequate medical treatment.”698 
Fourth, after examining the various constitutional provisions 
that guarantee priority rights, the article then moved on to examine those 
constitutional provisions that guarantee internally qualified rights. Specific 
attention was paid to §§ 26, 27 and 29. Again, reference was made to 
several cases in which South African courts have interpreted these 
provisions. Finally, the article looked at other ESC rights in South 
Africa’s Constitution, which do not fit easily into the classifications 
“priority rights” and “internally qualified rights.”699 
The final part of the article was devoted to an in depth 
examination of two important South African cases, which were 
decided by the country’s Constitutional Court (“CC”) to show the 
extent to which international law is serving as an interpretive aid or 
tool in the CC’s evolving jurisprudence, especially as it concerns ESC 
rights. The cases examined were the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others,700 and the Minister of Health and 
Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others.701 In Grootboom and Others, 
the appellants—the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the 
Premier of the Province of the Western Cape, the Cape Metropolitan 
Council, and Oostenberg Municipality—had been ordered by the High 
Court to provide the respondents (Irene Grootboom and others and 
their children) with adequate temporary shelter while they waited to 
                                               
 697 Van Biljon and Others, supra note 366. 
 698 CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 35(2)(e). 
 699 For example, rights related to labor relations. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 
§ 23. 
 700 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444. 
 701 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581. 
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acquire permanent housing. The appellants had subsequently appealed 
the High Court’s order to the Constitutional Court. 
In adjudicating the appeal, Yacoob J, writing for the Court, 
noted that extensive use was made of international law, noting that 
“[d]uring argument, considerable weight was attached to the value of 
international law” as an interpretive tool or aid in the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights.702 The learned justice also noted that “where the 
relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be 
directly applicable.”703 Yacoob J also held that “[t]he differences 
between the relevant provisions of the [International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)] and [the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa] are significant in 
determining the extent to which the provisions of the [ICESCR] may 
be a guide to an interpretation of section 26.”704 
The Grootboom Court also considered the views of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”). 
Referring specifically to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3, 
Yacoob J noted that it is clear from examining paragraph 10 of General 
Comment No. 3 that the CESCR “considers that every state party is 
bound to fulfil a minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction 
of a minimum essential level of the socio-economic rights, including 
the right to adequate housing.”705 The learned justice noted, however, 
that determining the “minimum threshold for the progressive 
realization of the right of access to adequate housing”706 must be undertaken 
through a process that takes “context” into consideration.707 
A similar approach was adopted in the second case that was 
examined in the present article, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others.708 This, too, was an appeal in which the 
                                               
 702 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 26. 
 703 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 26. 
 704 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 27. 
 705 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 30. 
 706 Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 32. 
 707 That context includes specifically such factors as “income, 
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444, at para. 32. 
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appellants prayed for the reversal or dismissal of “orders made in a 
high court against government because of perceived shortcomings in 
its response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS challenge.”709 The Court 
noted that in Grootboom, Yacoob J had made use of the ICESCR and 
had held that in terms of South Africa’s Bill of Rights, the issue that 
needed to be addressed was “whether the measures taken by the State 
to realize the right” in question “are reasonable.”710 The CC in 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, noted Magaisa, “placed the issues 
within the international context by referring the country’s obligations 
in terms of the International Covenant on Economic[,] Social and 
Cultural Rights.”711 Magaisa also noted that “[i]n two previous cases 
the CC had tackled the same issue, so this case extends the positive 
and active stance that the court seems to have taken in relation to 
matters affecting socio-economic rights” and that “[i]n light of [the 
CC’s] previous decisions, the justiciability of socio-economic rights is 
already a settled point and this case only served to cement that 
position.”712 In its decisions in both cases, the CC also noted support 
from jurisprudence from the courts of other jurisdictions, including, 
for example, Canada,713 Germany,714 India,715 the UK,716 and the United 
States.717 
Scholars who support the use of international law as an 
interpretive tool argue that “imposing a general obligation on all judges 
to consider international law will increase the frequency with which 
international law will influence judicial reasoning since lawyers will 
increasingly treat international law as a legitimate and reliable resource 
which operates independently of the judicial personality.”718 South 
                                               
 709 Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, para. 2. 
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Africa’s post-apartheid constitution—the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996—imposes an obligation on courts to consider 
international law when they interpret the Bill of Rights. According to 
§ 39, “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum—(b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign 
law.”719 In addition, the Constitution states that “[c]ustomary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”720 Finally, the Constitution 
provides that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.”721 
South Africa’s post-apartheid legal order is governed by “clear 
and robust rules which [have] replaced [the country’s] common law 
system.”722 Within this new post-apartheid legal system, the 
applicability of international law is governed by constitutional 
provisions. Nevertheless, it is noted that South African judges do not 
always make use of international law in their decisions and that 
“ideology and judicial personality obstruct the full realization of 
international law in South African constitutional adjudication.”723 
These criticisms aside, it is important to recognize the fact that South 
Africa’s post-apartheid legal system is young and still in its embryonic 
stages. As argued by Hudson, “[i]t may be that time is one of the most 
significant alternate variables; maybe it simply takes more time than 
has passed in South Africa for lawyers and judges to become fully 
immersed in international legal culture.”724 Hudson argues further that 
“[r]espect for authority is cultivated through repeated engagement with 
institutional rules and roles; actors come to identify themselves as 
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members of a social institution and feel obligated to discharge their 
obligations as members.”725 
With respect to the recognition, respect and protection of 
human rights, the ideal situation is for each African country to 
incorporate the provisions of international human rights instruments 
into their national constitutions and thus, create rights that are 
justiciable in domestic courts. This process, of course, will take some 
time. In the meantime, as noted by the International Commission of 
Jurists, in countries where “international treaties do not apply until 
domestic legislation reproduces or refers to the content of a treaty,” 
judges in such countries “have developed more creative ways of 
making use of international standards.”726 The International 
Commission of Jurists then went on to mention that South Africa, 
which at the time had not yet ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and hence, was not a State Party 
to the Covenant, actually “used CESCR’s General Comments to 
interpret the ESC rights enshrined in the South African 
Constitution.”727 
The policy imperative in African countries that have not done 
so is for each of them to engage in robust constitutional reforms to 
provide themselves with national constitutions undergirded by the 
separation of powers with checks and balances. Among the checks and 
balances must be a truly and fully independent judiciary, armed with 
the necessary capacity to function effectively as a check on the exercise 
of government power. The functions of such an independent judiciary 
must include the interpretation of the national constitution. In 
addition, each country should domesticate international human rights 
instruments and create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. 
Where the incorporation of international law into the national 
constitution has not yet taken place, judges can use their powers to 
interpret the constitution to bring local laws, including customs and 
traditions, into compliance or conformity with the provisions of 
international human rights instruments. Thus, in the absence of the 
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domestication of international human rights law through positive 
legislative acts, courts can minimize the abuse of human rights by using 
international law as an interpretive tool in their legal adjudications. The 
ultimate goal, however, remains the domestication of international 
human rights instruments to create rights that are justiciable in 
domestic courts. 
